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Chapter 1: Institutional Stock Holdings and the Cross-Section of Op-
tion Returns
1.1 Introduction
As a popular nancial derivative, option is widely used for speculation and
hedging purposes. There is a large literature studying whether option trading pre-
dicts stock returns through an information channel. This paper looks at the oppo-
site direction: Could institutional investors' stock holdings predict option returns?
I explore a hedging and demand pressure channel: Financial institutions are major
holders of U.S. stock markets. Their stock holdings, viewed as endowments, should
contain important information on their demands for options, which can be used by
institutions to manage endowment risks. Since options cannot be perfectly hedged,
option market makers will charge premiums for demand imbalances caused by in-
stitutions. If there are heterogeneous institutional hedging demands across rms,
stock holdings may predict the cross-section of corresponding equity option returns.
In addition to directional risk, stock positions also expose their holders to
stochastic variance risk, which is the focus of this paper. Survey evidence shows
that variance risk is a major concern of institutional investors: 39% of them utilize
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variance derivatives to hedge against variance risk (The Economist Intelligence Unit
2012).1 Since derivatives have embedded leverages, institutional investors use them
as a low cost way to achieve desired risk exposures (Koski and Ponti [1999]). Chen
[2011] nds evidence that hedge funds use derivatives to reduce risk-taking; For
mutual funds, derivative use is also negatively related with fund risk prole.2 Due to
limited evidence associating derivative use with increased institutional risk-taking3,
this paper focuses on institutional hedging demand for derivatives and abstracts
away from speculating demand.
The eect of demand imbalance on option pricing has been documented by
previous literature. Unlike in Black and Scholes [1973] model, option market mak-
ers cannot perfectly hedge their positions due to frictions in real market (Figlewski
[1989]; Green and Figlewski [1999]). Muravyev [2016] nds that order imbalances at-
tributable to inventory risk have greater predictive power than any other commonly
used option return predictors. Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman [2008] explicitly
model demand pressure eects on option prices and empirically document that on
average across rms, equity options are less used for hedging than index options
are.4 However, their model treats demand imbalance as exogenous and is agnostic
1For example, on 10/31/2000, an equity mutual fund called ClearBridge utilized a collar strategy
to hedge against the potential variance risk originated from its largest equity holdings: it held a
long position on Adobe Inc. stocks worth $137 million and 4.75% of portfolio weight; the fund
also long 1.8 million shares of Adobe puts, worth $17.1 million, with a strike price of 140 and
short 1.8 million shares of calls, worth $9.1 million, with a strike price of 195. Option holdings of
ClearBridge alone amount to 9.71% of Adobe's option market value.
2See Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway [2011], Cici and Palacios [2015], and Koski and Ponti [1999].
3The most commonly cited reason for derivative use by institutional investors is hedging (Levich,
Hayt, and Ripston [1999]). In Koski and Ponti [1999], only 8.5% of mutual funds use derivatives
for speculative purposes.
4They nd that end-users are net short equity options but are net long index options, espe-
cially for out-of-the-money index puts. Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman [2007] nd that
demand for call is larger than that for put in equity option markets.
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about the source of option end-users' demand. This paper specically explores the
hedging demand from institutional investors against variance risks originated from
their stock positions. I also use institutional stock holdings to construct a proxy to
measure heterogeneous option hedging demands across rms and show that it can
predict cross-sectional option returns.
I measure the expensiveness of options using variance risk premium (VRP
henceforth), calculated as the return of an option portfolio daily hedged by trading
the underlying stock. I call it the VIX portfolio hereafter. The name comes from the
CBOE VIX index, constructed from a portfolio of options whose held-to-maturity
payo equals the realized variance of the underlying stock return. I apply the CBOE
methodology to individual rms and calculates returns of rms' VIX portfolios.
I use the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI henceforth) of institutional own-
ership of a rm's stocks as a rm-level proxy for institutional investors' hedging
demands against stochastic variance risk originated from their stock positions. This
measure is motivated from a model in Smith [2019]: In a stochastic variance set-
ting, investors' stock positions expose them to variance risk and they hedge the risk
by long VIX portfolio whose payo equals future realized variance. In equilibrium,
HHI is proportional to investors' aggregate hedging demand for VIX portfolio.5 In-
tuitively, for stocks with more concentrated ownership, some institutional holders
are more likely to overweight them and demand more of their options to hedge.
Empirically, I nd that HHI negatively predicts the cross-section of option
5Each investor's hedging demand for the variance derivative is a quadratic function of her stock
holding. Summing across investors, the aggregate hedging demand is proportional to HHI.
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returns. Using Morningstar dataset on holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds, I
identify funds that use equity options and show that the predictability of HHI comes
from funds that actually use options, especially from those long puts. I also nd the
predictability driven by funds that overweight the rm relative to their benchmark
indexes. After matching option holdings with underlying rms, I nd that when
a rm's HHI increases, its option market becomes more active and mutual funds
take a larger share in this market. Robustness checks show that HHI does not
predict future stock return or variance. Its option return predictability does not
work through an information channel. Also, its predictability cannot be explained
by rm size or number of rm's institutional holders.
I construct HHI using individual mutual fund level stock holdings in S12
database and more aggregate level holdings of 13f institution in S34, respectively.
Both measures negatively predict cross-sectional option returns. In a horse race,
individual fund level HHI can subsume the information contained in the institution
level HHI. A possible reason is that due to managerial compensation incentives, fund
managers make hedging decisions based on their own fund holdings and not on the
fund family holdings aggregated into S34. In this case, fund level HHI constructed
from S12 is a better proxy for hedging demand. This paper focuses on the fund level
measure.
For the hedging and demand pressure channel to work, there are two necessary
components: order imbalance and price impact. I check the two parts, respectively,
by testing related theories in the literature. I nd that the predictability is stronger
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among stocks held by mutual fund holders who suer recent lower performance6 and
have higher ow volatilities and portfolio concentrations. This is expected because
those stocks' fund holders are more likely to use options to hedge and cause order
imbalances. The predictability is stronger during periods in which intermediaries
suer tighter funding liquidity constraint, because intermediaries as option market
makers charge higher compensation for bearing order imbalances when they are
more constrained. The predictability is also stronger among stocks with higher
stochastic volatility risk, jump risk and stock market illiquidity. This is because
options written on those stocks are more dicult to hedge and have higher price
impact (Garleanu et al. (2008)). A given level of order imbalance can cause a larger
cross-sectional dispersion in those stocks' option returns.
I further examine how HHI is related with the systematic and idiosyncratic
components of VRP. Assuming stock returns follow the market model, I write rm's
VRP as a weighted average of systematic and idiosyncratic components. Then I use
a cross-sectional regression to estimate the two components jointly and nd that
HHI is negatively related with both components. If some institutional investors
hold concentrated positions in rms with higher HHI, they are supposed to be more
sensitive to both systematic and idiosyncratic variances and pay higher premiums
to hedge those risks. This will lead to more negative systematic and idiosyncratic
VRP.
The systematic VRP embedded in equity options is estimated to be 12.3%,
6I nd a reversed pattern at year-end, consistent with the managerial gaming story in Brown,
Harlow, and Starks [1996] and Chevalier and Ellison [1997]: For window dressing purpose at the
end of year, loser funds increase risk-taking and winners tend to hedge to preserve good results.
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statistically dierent from that measured by S&P 500 Index options (-23.2%). A
trading strategy that long rms with high exposure to systematic variance risk and
short those with low exposure generates a monthly return of 17.5% and an annual
Sharpe Ratio of 1.76. The prots cannot be explained by the volatility mispricing
in Goyal and Saretto [2009] and the idiosyncratic volatility eect in Cao and Han
[2013]. The underpricing of systematic variance risk in equity options can partially
explain the puzzle that equity options appear cheaper than index options.7
I oer a partial explanation for the dierential pricing from the perspective of
dierent demand patterns and compositions of traders in index and equity option
markets. It has been well documented that equity options are less used for hedg-
ing than index options are8 and that individual investors have a larger impact in
equity option markets than in index option market9. I hypothesize that in equity
option markets, compared with less sophisticated individual investors who are more
likely to chase a rm's idiosyncratic variance for lottery-like payos,10 institutional
investors who hold concentrated positions in the rm would pay more attention to
systematic variance, which will be priced more consistently with that embedded in
index options. After sorting rms by HHI, I nd that systematic VRP estimated
from equity options of higher HHI subgroup becomes less positive and gets closer
to that estimated from index options. This is consistent with the hypothesis.
7See Bakshi and Kapadia [2003b], Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan [2003], Bollen and Whaley
[2004], Carr and Wu [2009], and Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov [2009].
8See Bollen and Whaley [2004], Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman [2008], and Lakonishok,
Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman [2007].
9Lemmon and Ni [2014] show that individual investors' sentiment aects the demand and pricing
for equity options but not for index options.
10See Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink [2010] and Boyer and Vorkink [2014].
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The idiosyncratic VRP is estimated to be -11.2%. The negative price is con-
sistent with the notion that options on stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities
attract high demand from speculators, and that constrained nancial intermediaries
charge extra compensation for supplying these options because of their high hedging
costs (Cao and Han [2013]). The nding complements the literature on the pricing
of idiosyncratic volatility in nancial markets. Previous studies mainly focus on the
stock market.11
I construct an idiosyncratic VIX portfolio, whose payo approximates the real-
ized idiosyncratic variance of the rm's stock return. In a cross-sectional regression,
HHI negatively predicts the return of idiosyncratic VIX portfolio, suggesting that
institutions with concentrated positions in the rm are sensitive to idiosyncratic
volatility and pay a higher premium to hedge it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the construc-
tion of VIX portfolio and HHI. Section 3 investigates how HHI aects rm's VRP.
Section 4 presents a decomposition of VRP and explores the eect of HHI on the
systematic and idiosyncratic components of VRP. Section 5 reports the protability
of trading strategies. Section 6 oers concluding remarks.
1.2 Data Construction
This section presents the data steps to construct VIX portfolio and Herndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of the rm's stocks.
11Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang [2006] nd that idiosyncratic volatility negatively predicts
future stock returns in the cross section. An exception is Cao and Han [2013] who nd that
idiosyncratic volatilities negatively predict the cross-sectional delta-hedged option returns.
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1.2.1 VIX portfolio
I construct the VIX portfolio following Heston and Li [2020]. The payo of
VIX portfolio closely approximates the realized variance of stock return,12 dened as
the sum of squared daily stock return. The return of VIX portfolio directly measures
VRP.
VIX portfolio is composed of two parts: a static position in a portfolio of out-
of-the-money (OTM) options and a daily hedged position in the underlying stock.
The option position is constructed based on CBOE White Paper13 as follows:
V (t, T ) = 2
∑
i
O(Ki, t, T )∆i
K2i
, (1.1)
where: V (t, T ) is the time t price of option position maturing at T ; O(K, t, T )
represents time t price of an OTM call or put with strike price K and expiration T ;
Ki are the available strike prices of the rm's option contracts; ∆i is the distance
between adjacent strikes.
To make the VIX reect the future 30 days volatility, CBOE does interpolation
using near-term and next-term options. This paper does not follow this standard.
Instead, I form the option position in the VIX portfolio on the third Friday of each
month (t) and hold options to maturity, which is the third Friday of the subsequent
month (T ). By avoiding interpolation, I do not need to hold two option portfolios
with dierent maturities.
12The detailed proof is in the appendix.
13It can be found at https://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf.
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By augmenting the static option position with a daily hedged stock position
whose current price equals 0, I get the VIX portfolio, whose return equals
rhedged(t, T ) =










V (t, T )
− 1, (1.2)
where: S(t) is the stock price at time t; rf is the daily risk-free interest rate; r(u)
represents the stock return on day u, which is a day between time t and T .
In order to construct the VIX portfolio, investors need to: 1. take a static
option position formed on time t with price V (t, T ) and held-to-maturity payo
V (T, T ); 2. short a static hedged stock position with 0 current price and a nal
payo of 2( S(T )
S(t)(1+rf )T−t
− 1); 3. take a daily hedged stock position with 0 current
price and daily payo r(u)− rf .
Since I only use options with available strike prices to form VIX portfolio in
(1.1), the payo of the VIX portfolio only approximately equals realized variance,
with errors caused by discreteness of the strike interval. To gauge the tracking error,
I compare the return in (1.2) with the variance swap return (VSR), dened following
Carr and Wu [2009]:




V (t, T )
− 1. (1.3)
I construct VIX portfolios for both individual rms and the S&P 500 Index.
I call them equity and index VIX portfolios, respectively. For index VIX portfolio,
the correlation between its actual return and VSR is 0.99. Its payo is very close to
the realized variance over the month. As indicated in Figure 1.1, index VIX return
9
closely tracks VSR during the sample period. I calculate returns of VIX portfolios
for all optionable rms in the OptionMetrics Database, which gives a larger cross-
section than previous studies.14 The median of within-rm time-series correlation
between the rm's equity VIX return and VSR equals 0.88. By forming portfolios,
rm-level approximation errors could be diversied away. The correlation between
the return of cross-sectionally equally weighted (EW) equity VIX portfolio and EW
VSR is 0.91. Since most stocks have the same discrete intervals across strike prices,
the error caused by discrete strike intervals would be dierenced out when I form
long-short trading strategies.
Option data is drawn from the OptionMetrics Ivy DB database. The dataset
contains information on the entire U.S. equity option market and includes daily
closing bid and ask quotes, open interest, and trading volume of each option. Implied
volatility, option's delta, vega, and other Greeks are computed by OptionMetrics.
The zero-coupon rate of appropriate maturity (interpolated when necessary) from
OptionMetrics is used as the risk-free rate. Option positions in VIX portfolios are
formed on the third Friday of each month and are held to maturity, which is the third
Friday of the subsequent month. Sample period is from January 1996 to December
2017.
I construct VIX portfolios for all optionable rms in OptionMetrics, with the
following lters applied: (1) to avoid extremely small and illiquid stocks, the under-
lying stock prices should be at least $5, (2) delete rm-month observations in which
14Carr and Wu [2009] conduct their study using ve stock indexes and 35 individual stocks;
Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov [2009] look at the VRP of S&P 100 Index and its constituent
rms.
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there are stock splits, (3) following Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009), I dis-
card options with zero bid prices and with missing implied volatility or delta (which
occurs for options with nonstandard settlement or for options with intrinsic value
above the current mid price), (4) delete options whose ask price is lower than bid
price, (5) lter option contracts following CBOE White Paper, (6) option contracts
with zero open interest are removed, in order to eliminate options with no liquid-
ity, (7) delete options whose prices violate arbitrage bounds, (8) the midpoint price
of option needs to be at least $0.125, (9) following Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels
[2013], to reduce the bias caused by asymmetry in the domain of integration in equa-
tion A1, equal number of OTM calls and puts are used to construct VIX portfolio,
and (10) exclude rm-month observations if the underlying stock pays a dividend
during the remaining life of the option. Thus, options in my sample are close to the
European style. Also, VIX portfolio assigns a higher weight on OTM puts, whose
early exercise premium is lower. So, the early exercise premium of VIX portfolio is
expected to be low. The nal sample includes 138,339 rm-month observations and
5,012 unique stocks over the sample period. To pass the option lters, stocks in the
sample tend to be relatively large stocks with liquid option markets. Results in this
paper are not driven by small stocks.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics. There are 526 stocks per month on
average. Equity VIX portfolio consists of 6 option contracts on average. For index
VIX portfolio, the average number of contracts is 84. Index VIX return has a
mean of -23.24% per month. The large negative return reects the large negative
VRP embedded in index options documented by Carr and Wu [2009] and Driessen,
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Maenhout, and Vilkov [2009].
The pooled sample mean of equity VIX return is -5.13%. Each month, I
equally weight rms' equity VIX portfolios. The time-series average of the equally
weighted (EW) equity VIX return is -4.82%, which is much less negative than that
of the index. This is broadly consistent with the result in previous literature stating
that VRP of individual stocks are much less negative than that of the index.
For each rm, βIndex V IX Return is the exposure of its VIX return to index VIX
return. The average exposure across rms is 0.33. Corr(Equity VIX Return, Stock
Return) is the rm-level time-series correlation between equity VIX return and the
underlying stock return. The mean correlation across rms is -0.26, reecting a
leverage eect. To calculate the exposure and correlations, rms are required to
have at least 30 observations. There are 1,389 rms meeting this requirement.
Other databases are used to extract the information needed later in this paper.
Information about stock returns, accounting data, and analyst forecasts are obtained
from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S, respectively. The Fama-French common
risk factors are taken from Kenneth French's website.
1.2.2 HHI of institutional ownership
I use Thomson Reuters S12 Database to construct the quarterly HHI of mutual
fund ownership of the rm's equity shares. The database includes all registered
domestic mutual funds ling with the SEC and their equity holdings. A more
aggregate level HHI is constructed using the S34 Database, which covers the holdings
12
of entire investment companies, often called 13f institutions. S12 and S34 dier
in their levels of coverage: almost every fund in the S12 set has a manager in
the S34 set, and the latter reports the aggregated holdings of all funds under the
manager's control. For example, Fidelity reports as a single entity and aggregates
the holdings of all funds and trusts that it manages into its quarterly 13f lings,
whose information would be included in the S34. Fidelity also reports holdings of
its individual funds, whose information is included in the S12.
For each rm, its HHI of mutual fund ownership is constructed in the following
steps: First, delete observations whose le date and report date are not in the same
quarter, in order to avoid stale reports. Second, delete observations with missing
fund assets. Third, for each rm, calculate the total number of shares owned by all
mutual funds and the share proportion owned by each fund. Fourth, calculate the
rm's HHI as the sum of squared share proportion owned by each fund i as follows:








where N is the total number of funds that hold the rm's stocks. The institutional
level HHI could be calculated in the same method using the S34 dataset. It could
also be downloaded directly from the WRDS TR 13-F Stock Ownership database.
The decision to scale the share holding of each fund (institution) by total
mutual fund (institution) share holdings, instead of total shares outstanding of the
rm, is not arbitrary and depends on whether small retail investors hedge their
equity positions using equity options. Imagine two rms: Firm A and Firm B. Firm
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A is 100% owned by one fund. 50% shares of Firm B is owned by one fund, with the
other half owned by many small retail investors. Assume that small investors do not
use options to hedge.15 Then, all the hedging demands in equity option markets for
both rms should come from only the fund that owns the rm. However, if I scale
by total shares outstanding of the rm, Firm A's HHI equals 1, while Firm B's HHI
equals 0.25. HHI calculated this way would be misleading as a proxy for hedging
demand.
Panel B in Table 1.1 reports summary statistics of mutual fund and 13f in-
stitution level HHI. The average HHI of mutual funds is 0.139, higher than that of
institutions (0.057). The fund-level HHI has a standard deviation of 0.196, more
variable than that of the institution-level measure (0.069).
1.3 HHI and the Cross-Section of VIX Returns
This section examines how mutual fund HHI predicts cross-sectional equity
VIX returns, which is a direct measure of rm VRP. HHI is interpreted as a rm-level
proxy for variance risk hedging demand in equity option markets. Intuitively, an
increase in mutual funds ownership concentration in the underlying equity market
drives up their hedging demand for equity options, and dealers charge a higher
premium to absorb the increased order imbalances. Appendix B presents a simple
model built on Smith [2019] to motivate the HHI measure: In a stochastic volatility
15Lakonishok et al (2007) examine households' holdings from a large discount brokerage rm.
They nd that even though account holdings are predominantly common stocks, only 1.3% posi-
tions are equity options, and less than half of those option positions come from accounts that hold
the underlying stock. Therefore, this assumption is relatively innocuous.
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setting, investors' equity positions expose them to variance risk, and they hedge
the risk by purchasing a variance derivative with a payo of realized variance. In
equilibrium, each investor's hedging demand for the variance derivative is a quadratic
function of her equity holding. Thus, the aggregate hedging demand of the rm's
equity holders is proportional to HHI.
1.3.1 VIX return predictability of HHI
This section examines and compares the VIX return predictability of mutual
fund and institution level HHI. There is a trade-o between granularity and coverage:
The fund level measure is constructed from the S12 database, which is more granular
than S34. Due to managerial compensation incentives, fund managers may make
hedging decisions based on their own fund holdings and not on the aggregate fund
family holdings. In this case, fund level HHI is a better proxy for hedging demand
than institution level HHI. On the other hand, S34 has a broader coverage than S12.
In addition to mutual funds, S34 includes the holdings of pension funds, insurance
companies, and endowments. The broader coverage can make institution level HHI
a better proxy.
I run monthly Fama and MacBeth [1973] cross-sectional regression
ri,t+1 = αt + γtHHIi,t + θtXi,t + εi,t+1,
to examine the predictability of HHI on the one-month-ahead equity VIX returns.
As a control variable, holdings of mutual fund (institution) is calculated as the
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rm's total shares held by all mutual funds (institutions) divided by the rm's total
number of shares outstanding. Schürho and Ziegler [2011] nd that holdings of
mutual fund positively predict cross-sectional equity variance swap returns. The
reason is that mutual funds sell options on average. This supply pressure makes
options cheaper and rms' VRP less negative.
Table 1.2 reports the regression results. When fund level HHI is used alone as
a predictor, its coecient estimate is -0.24, with a t-statistic of -7.17. A standard
deviation increase in HHI decreases the monthly option return by 4.7%. Hedging
demands for equity options are higher among rms with larger HHI, which would
push up option prices and make rms' VRP more negative. Controlling for share
proportion owned by mutual funds only slightly changes the coecient estimate and
t-statistic of HHI. The coecient estimate of holdings of mutual funds is weakly
signicant and positive. Institution level HHI exhibits a similar pattern. Unlike
mutual funds, holdings of institutions have a weaker and insignicant positive eect
on option returns. A possible reason is that 13f institutions other than mutual funds
demand equity options, which counteracts the net selling eect of mutual funds. The
story is supported by specication (5): In a multivariate regression, the coecient
of holdings of institution is -0.075 with a t-statistic of -3.02. Whereas, the coecient
of mutual fund holdings is signicantly positive.
To do a horse race between the fund and institution level measure, I run a
multivariate regression including all four variables in Column (5). The coecient
estimate of fund level HHI is only slightly aected. However, the coecient estimate
and t-statistic of institution level HHI are more than halved. This suggests that
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mutual fund HHI constructed from more granular level data is a better proxy for
hedging demand.
Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman [2008] document a net short position of
end-users in equity option markets. Lakonishok et al. (2007) nd that directional
hedging account for a small fraction of trading in equity option markets. Their
results suggest that hedging demand is less important in determining the overall
level of option activity and returns in equity option market. However, the evidence
documented by the two papers is on an aggregate level. The potential heterogeneity
in hedging demands across rms can cause a large impact on option returns.
1.3.2 Robustness checks
This section checks whether the predictability of HHI can be explained by
other option return predictors. I also use delta-hedged call and put returns in
Bakshi and Kapadia [2003a] as additional testing assets. The return predictability
of HHI cannot be absorbed by other predictors, size, number of fund holders for the
rm's stocks, and industry eects. I also nd no evidence supporting that HHI is a
proxy for insider information about future stock return or volatility.
Control variables are as follows: volatility-related mispricing measures includ-
ing idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) documented in Cao and Han [2013], log dif-
ference between historical volatility and equity VIX (HV-VIX) modied from the
volatility deviation measure in Goyal and Saretto [2009]; rm characteristics stud-
ied in Cao, Han, Tong, and Zhan [2017], including short-term stock return reversal
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(RETt−1,t), stock return momentum (RETt−12,t−1), long-term stock return reversal
(RETt−36,t−12), size (Ln(ME)), book-to-market (Ln(BM)), analyst earnings fore-
cast dispersion (Analyst Dispersion), cash holdings (CH), protability (Prot), new
issues (Issue); higher-order moments of stock returns calculated using historical
one-year daily data: skewness (Rolling Skew) and kurtosis (Rolling Kurt); the risk-
neutral skewness of stock returns inferred from a portfolio of options (RN Skew) is
included as a measure for jump risk (Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan [2003]); Amihud
illiquidity measure (Amihud) is calculated for each stock as a proxy for the underly-
ing stock's liquidity (Amihud [2002]); the percentage bid-ask spread of equity VIX
portfolio is used as a proxy for option liquidity. Detailed variable constructions are
in the appendix.
Table 1.3 report results of the following Fama-MacBeth regression:
ri,t+1 = αt + γtHHIi,t + θtControlsi,t + εi,t+1.
In specications (1) and (2), fund and institution level HHI both signicantly and
negatively predict equity VIX returns. The coecient on fund level HHI is -0.21 with
a t-statistic of -4.46; the coecient on institution level HHI is -0.279 with a t-statistic
of -4.01. When I include both measures in specication (3), the coecient of fund
level HHI remains signicant with a t-statistic of -3.52. However, the coecient of
institution level HHI becomes insignicant, conrming the early nding in Table 1.2
that mutual fund HHI constructed from more granular level data is a better proxy.
In Specications (4) and (5), fund level HHI also negatively predicts delta-hedged
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call and put returns with similar t-statistics.
Firm size and HHI are negatively correlated with an average cross-sectional
correlation of -0.38. To control for the potential nonlinear pricing relation between
the two variables, I implement a double-sort procedure, with results reported in
Panel A of Table A1.1. Returns sorted by HHI are signicant in every size quintile.
The information contained in HHI cannot be absorbed by size.
Another concern is that the predictability is related with the number of fund
holders in the rm: when a rm is owned by fewer funds, HHI becomes larger by
denition. In fact, their correlation is -0.43. I implement the same double-sort
procedure: rst sort rms into quintiles by the number of fund holders, then further
sort each quintile by HHI. Results are reported in Panel B of Table A1.1. Returns
sorted by HHI are signicant in groups with both low and high number of fund
holders. There are no systematic pattern showing that the predictability is related
with the number of fund holders. Adding number of fund holders as a variable in
Table 1.3 does not predict option returns and makes little dierence in the return
predictability of HHI.
I further check whether option return predictability of HHI comes from its
ability to predict future stock return or variance of the underlying rm. I run
Fama-MacBeth regression and use HHI to predict one-month-ahead stock return
and realized variance, respectively, controlling for variables in Table 1.3. Panel C in
Table A1.1 reports the results. The coecients of HHI are insignicant. Therefore,
it is implausible that HHI contains information about future stock return or variance.
Since index funds are unlikely to use equity options, their holdings should not
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contain information about hedging demand. In an unreported test, I calculate HHI
using only stock holdings of index funds and nd that the index fund HHI does not
predict option return.
To remove industry eect, I classify rms into 10 industries, following the
procedure in Kenneth French's data library. I demean rms' VIX returns by industry
average each month and run the same regressions. Results (unreported for brevity)
are very similar.
This section shows that fund level HHI cannot be fully absorbed by previously
documented option return predictors. Since institution level HHI loses signicance
after including fund level HHI and other controls, the rest of this paper will focus
on the mutual fund level measure.
1.3.3 HHI of option funds and non-option funds
This section examines the explanatory power of HHI of option funds and non-
option funds16 on equity VIX returns, respectively. All HHIs in this and next section
are constructed using Morningstar U.S. equity mutual fund holdings data from 1996
to 2015 (4509 funds in total).17 18 I nd that the explanatory power of HHI comes
from option funds and especially from funds that long puts. Funds that specialize
in selling options, i.e. covered call strategy, have positive, instead of negative, eect
16If a mutual fund has equity options in its portfolio, I call it "option fund". If a fund never
holds equity options, I call it "non-option fund".
17I am especially grateful to David Hunter for sharing this dataset. The dataset is used in
his paper Hunter [2015] "Mind the Gap: The Portfolio Eects of `Other' Holdings", available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3684031.
18A limitation of this dataset is that it does not cover the holdings of alternative funds, which
are heavy option users according to Deli, Hanouna, Stahel, Tang, and Yost [2015].
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on option returns. This is inconsistent with the story that the predictability of
HHI comes from funds with skills in identifying overvalued options and sell them
to generate alpha. Another nding is that option funds do not have higher alphas
relative to non-option funds. This is inconsistent with the story that funds use
options for informed speculation. I also nd that the predictability of HHI comes
from funds that overweight the rm relative to their benchmark indexes, consistent
with a hedging story.
An important advantage of the Morningstar dataset over the CRSP Mutual
Fund database is that it provides non-equity fund holdings, including options. This
allows me to identify mutual funds that actually trade equity options and separately
study the eect of their ownership on VRP. However, unlike equity holdings, funds
report option holdings in a nonstandard way: most of the option holdings do not
have common identiers like CUSIP; funds usually do not report important char-
acteristics of option contracts, like strike price and maturity; and underlying rm
names are abbreviated, and sometimes funds use tickers instead of names.
To extract equity option holdings, I follow procedures used in Cici and Palacios
[2015]: I use the security names of fund holdings as the main input, and identify
observations that contain the "Call" or "Put" text strings in the names; I then use
visual inspection to remove misclassication and index options and only keep equity
options. The nal sample contains 48,664 observations. 607 out of 4509 equity funds
utilized equity options during the sample period.
Next, I classify all equity funds into option funds and non-option funds and
study the eects of their stock ownership on VRP, respectively. Panel A in Table 1.4
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reports the average coecients of Fama-MacBeth regressions. HHI MStar is con-
structed using only the stock holdings of U.S. equity funds in Morningstar. HHI Non
MStar is constructed from funds in S12 but uncovered by the Morningstar dataset. I
construct this variable to check whether using only U.S. equity funds in Morningstar
would lose information in predicting option returns. HHI Overweight (Underweight)
is constructed using the holdings of funds in Morningstar that overweight (under-
weight) the rm relative to their benchmark indexes.19 If the predictability comes
from hedging demand, it should be driven by funds that overweight the rm. HHI
Option Fund is constructed using only the 607 option funds. HHI Put Fund is
constructed using only funds that use puts. If a fund uses volatility strategy like
straddle or collar, it would be classied into this category. HHI Call Fund is con-
structed using funds that only use calls and never use puts. The union of Put Funds
and Call Funds equals total Option Funds. HHI Put Short is constructed using put
funds that only short puts but never long puts. HHI Put Long is constructed using
put funds that long puts. The union of funds in Put Short and Put Long equals
total Put Funds. HHI Call Short is constructed using call funds that only short calls
but never long calls. HHI Call Long is constructed using call funds that long calls.
The union of funds in Call Short and Call Long equals total Call Funds. The sample
includes: 607 option funds, 343 put funds, 264 call funds, 243 long put funds, 100
short put funds, 94 long call funds, and 170 short call funds. In each column, I
control for the corresponding share proportions owned by each fund category. For
19I download benchmarks of mutual funds from the Morningstar Direct platform. I use portfolio
holdings of iShares ETFs to proxy the composition and weights of stocks in the benchmarks.
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brevity, their coecients are unreported here.
In Column (1), HHI MStar negatively predicts VIX returns. Column (2) shows
that funds in S12 uncovered by the Morningstar dataset also negatively predict op-
tion returns, controlling for HHI MStar. Thus, by restricting the sample to only
U.S. equity funds, HHI loses some option return predictability. In Column (3), HHI
Overweight negatively predicts VIX returns, while the coecient of HHI Under-
weight is insignicant. This is consistent with a hedging story.20 In Column (4),
HHI Option Fund crowds out the explanatory power of HHI MStar. This is ex-
pected because it should be the ownership of option funds that aects the demand
for options. Results in Columns (5) and (6) both suggest that the negative eect
of HHI Option Fund comes from put funds, who are more likely to use options for
hedging, but not from call funds. In Column (6), the coecient of HHI Call Fund
is positive and weakly signicant. A potential explanation is that many call funds
use covered-call strategy and sell calls, which pushes down option prices. Column
(7) shows that it is the funds that long puts who are driving the option return pre-
dictability. They are the type of funds who are most likely to use options for hedging
purpose. An alternative story for the negative predictability of HHI is that some
funds have skills in identifying overvalued options and sell them to generate alpha,
instead of hedging. The positive coecient of HHI Call Short and insignicantly
negative coecient of HHI Put Short are inconsistent with this story.
To check how long the predictability of HHI lasts, I run a Fama-MacBeth
20In unreported test, I nd that neither HHI Overweight nor Underweight predicts future stock
returns. This is inconsistent with an information channel.
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regression regressing rms' VIX returns on the lagged n (1 to 12) month HHI con-
structed from option funds. Figure 1.2 plots the coecient estimates of HHI (solid
blue line) and the 95% condence intervals (dashed black lines) with respect to
month lags. The coecients remain signicant for up to 6 months. Contrary to the
demand pressure pattern in stock market, there is no reversal in option market. A
potential explanation is that options expire each month and there will be no reversal
following high demands.
To check whether funds trade options for hedging or speculation, I compare
the risk proles of option and non-option funds under three Morningstar investment
categories: Domestic Blend, Domestic Growth, and Domestic Value. For each fund,
I compute its alpha relative to Carhart [1997] four-factor model, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis of monthly fund returns using CRSP mutual funds database.
To get a precise estimate, I delete funds with less than 24 observations during the
sample period. When a fund has multiple share classes, I take average. To check
how concentrated a fund's portfolio is, for each fund, I compute the HHI of its eq-
uity holdings at each quarter and then take time-series average. To compare, I use
a two-sided t-test to check the dierences in mean estimates of the above fund char-
acteristics between non-option funds and option, put, and call funds, respectively.
All variables are winsorized at 0.5% level.
Table A1.2 reports the dierences in mean estimates and associated p-values.
Users/Total is the proportion of certain type of funds under a specic Morningstar
category. For example, 11.03% (5.71%) in the rst row means that 11.03% (5.71%)
of domestic blend funds use equity options (puts). In every case, alphas are not
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signicantly dierent among non-option, option, put, and call funds. The nding is
inconsistent with the story that funds use options to do informational bets.
Among blend and value funds, option funds (specically put funds) hold more
concentrated equity portfolios than non-option funds. The average portfolio HHI
of put funds is 0.32% (0.70%) higher than that of non-option funds in the category
of blend (value) funds. Given that the average fund portfolio HHI is 2.11%, the
dierences are sizable. The standard deviation of put funds is not signicantly
larger than that of non-option funds. Conditional on the fact that put funds hold
more concentrated portfolios, it is possible that they trade options to reduce their
risk proles to a similar level of non-option funds.
Overall, results in this section suggest that the negative eect of HHI on VRP
comes from funds that actually use equity options, especially long puts. The com-
parison of risk proles among funds is inconsistent with the hypothesis that mutual
funds use equity options for informed speculation.
1.3.4 Mutual fund option market activity and HHI
This section directly checks the link between HHI and fund option demands.
I examine the relation between HHI constructed from option funds and fund option
market activity (FOMA). FOMAi,t is dened as the aggregate holdings on rm i's
options across equity funds at the end of quarter t, scaled by the total dollar open
interest of rm i's option market. FOMAi,t essentially measures rm i's option
market share held by all U.S. equity funds at quarter t. I nd that when a rm's
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HHI increases, FOMA also increases.
I use the Morningstar dataset in last section to construct FOMA. Again, a
caveat of this dataset is that it does not cover alternative funds, which are heavy
option users according to Deli et al. (2015). Thus, FOMA calculated here is a
lower bound for mutual funds equity option market shares, which is a limitation of
this study. To construct FOMA, rst, I match each option holding with the un-
derlying rm. Since option holdings do not have common identiers, I rst use a
name-matching algorithm based on spelling distance to match security names with
rm names. Funds report the security names of option holdings in a nonstandard
way: Most of the times, funds use abbreviations in rm names. Sometimes funds
use tickers instead of rm names. For those rms, I use visual inspections to pick
them out and match their security names with rm tickers. Then I do nal visual
inspections to lter out misclassication. Second, I aggregate holdings on rm i's
options across equity funds at the end of each quarter. Third, using the Option-
Metrics Database, I calculate the total dollar open interest for each rm at the end
of each quarter and match with the observations in last step to calculate FOMAi,t.
The nal sample has 19,932 rm-quarter observations with non-missing FOMA and
1,793 unique rms.
To check how HHI is related with FOMA, I sort rms into deciles by option
funds HHI and report the average FOMA for each decile in Panel A of Table 1.5.
When HHI increases from Decile 1 to Decile 10, FOMA monotonically increases
from 0.38% to 5.34%.
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To control for other variables, I run the following quarterly panel regression:
FOMAi,t = αi + γHHIi,t + δControlsi,t + εi,t,
where: αi is the rm xed eect. Control variables include: rm size (Ln(ME)),
book-to-market (Ln(BM)), short-term stock return reversal (RETt−1,t), stock return
momentum (RETt−12,t−1), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) calculated from Fama-
French 3-factor model using past one-month daily data, total volatility of stock
return (VOL) calculated using past one-month daily data, number of analysts fol-
lowing the rm (Analyst Number), and the divergence of analysts' opinions (Analyst
Dispersion). Control variables common to all rms at quarter t are also included:
Index Returnt−6,t is the return of the S&P 500 Index over the past 6 months; In-
dex VIX is the S&P 500 Index VIX at time t; Index RN Skew is the risk-neutral
skewness of the S&P 500 Index at time t. Standard errors are clustered at rm and
quarter levels.
Table 1.5 reports the regression results. Controlling for the share proportion
of the rm owned by all option funds, HHI is positively signicant at the 1% level,
with a t-statistic of 4.51. Adding other control variables, HHI remains signicant at
the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 2.60. The coecient of size is negative. For large
rms, mutual funds play a less important role in their equity option markets because
there are many other investors demanding options of those rms. The coecient
of idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is positive, meaning that funds take larger option
market shares for rms with higher IVOL. A possible explanation is that funds use
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equity options to hedge rms' IVOL.
To check whether the positive relation between HHI and FOMA is caused
by rms with illiquid option markets (the denominator of FOMA), I examine how
HHI is related to the rm's option market activity. Following Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam [2010], I use O/S, the option/stock dollar volume, to measure option
market activity. It is calculated as the option dollar open interest scaled by the
stock's monthly dollar trading volume. I multiply O/S by 100 and convert it to
percent. Then I run the same panel regression using O/S as the dependent variable.
The coecient of HHI is positively signicant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic
of 2.73. Thus, when a rm's HHI increases, the rm's equity option market also
becomes more active.
Overall, this section documents a positive relation between HHI and mutual
funds option market activity, consistent with HHI being a proxy for fund option
demands.
1.3.5 Demand pressure and price impact in equity option markets
If the predictability of HHI21 comes from the increased hedging demand driving
up option prices, there are two necessary components: demand pressure and price
impact in option market. The predictability should be positively related with order
21Last two sections construct HHI using only U.S. equity mutual funds holdings in the Morn-
ingstar Dataset. Starting from this section, I get back to before and use HHI constructed from all
funds in the S12 dataset because of its broader coverage.
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imbalance times the option price impact of demand pressure as follows:






Demand pressure is larger when mutual funds are more likely to use op-
tions to hedge. Garleanu et al. (2008) show that the price impact component:
∂p
∂d
= γ(Rf − 1)×Option Unhedgeable Risk, where γ is option dealer's risk aver-
sion. There are three forms of option unhedgeable risks: stochastic volatility risk,
jump risk, and delta-hedging cost. I check whether the pattern of predictability is
consistent with each component by testing some related theories in the literature.
First, I test four hypotheses related with when mutual funds tend to use deriva-
tives to hedge and cause demand pressures in option markets: 1. Funds are more
likely to use options to reduce risks following lower performance, which leads to un-
expected fund outows and makes fund portfolios riskier (Koski and Ponti [1999];
Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway [2011]). What is more, at the end of the year, due to
window dressing purpose, loser funds have lower hedging motives and winners tend
to hedge more in order to preserve good results (Brown, Harlow, and Starks [1996];
Chevalier and Ellison [1997]); 2. Funds with higher ow volatilities tend to use op-
tions to manage risks because their investor bases are less stable. Hypothesis 1 and
2 are both related with the ow-based motivation for mutual fund derivative use
proposed by Koski and Ponti [1999]; 3. When rms are overweighted by mutual
funds relative to benchmark, their fund holders are more likely to use those rms'
options to hedge; 4. Mutual funds with higher portfolio concentration tend to take
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hedging positions in option markets. Hypothesis 3 and 4 are both related with fund
managers' career concern discussed in Cohen, Polk, and Silli [2010]: A heavy bet on
a small number of positions can, in the presence of bad luck, cause the manager to
lose her job and the manager tends to be more risk averse.
Second, I test four hypotheses related with option price impacts based on
model predictions in Garleanu et al. (2008): 5. The predictability is stronger during
periods in which intermediaries suer tighter funding liquidity constraint. Because
intermediaries would be more risk averse and facing higher eective risk-free rates.
They charge higher compensation for bearing order imbalances, leading to larger
price impacts. 6. Since options written on stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatil-
ities have potentially higher stochastic volatility risk and are thus more dicult
to hedge (Cao and Han [2013]), dealers charge higher premiums, leading to larger
price impacts; 7. Options written on stocks with higher jump risk have larger price
impacts; 8. Options written on illiquid stocks have larger price impacts because it is
more costly to do high-frequency delta hedge for those options. In summary, options
mentioned above have larger price impacts and their pricings are more sensitive to
order imbalance. A given level of order imbalance can cause a larger cross-sectional
dispersion in those stocks' option returns.
To test the rst four hypotheses regarding demand pressure, I sort rms into
three groups (Low, Medium, and High) at each month t, respectively, by: the av-
erage of past quarter adjusted returns of mutual funds holding rm i, the average
of past-12-month ow volatilities of mutual funds holding rm i, the deviation of
rm i's weight in fund industry from its market weight, and the average of portfolio
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concentrations (measured as HHI) of mutual funds holding rm i. Among each sub-
group, I run the Fama-MacBeth regression ri,t+1 = αt + γtHHIi,t + θtXi,t + εi,t+1,
where: ri,t+1 is rm i's VIX return; Xi,t is a set of control variables as those in Table
1.3.
To construct the above mutual fund characteristics, I rst nd all mutual
funds (excluding index funds, ETF, and ETN) that hold rm i's stock at each
month. I take fund returns from CRSP Mutual Fund database and adjust them by
Morningstar investment category. I calculate fund ow at month t as:
TNAt − (1 + rt)TNAt−1
TNAt−1
,
where TNAt and rt are the fund's total net asset and monthly return at month
t, respectively. I construct fund portfolio concentrations, measured as HHI, using
equity holdings in S12 database. To calculate how much each rm is overweighted
by fund industry, I use the aggregate stock market as the benchmark and compute
the deviation of a rm's weight in total asset of fund industry from its weight in
aggregate stock market.
Panel A shows the coecients of HHI in Low, Medium, and High groups. The
patterns are consistent with Hypothesis 1, 2, 3, and 4. The negative predictabil-
ity is concentrated among rms with mutual fund holders that suer recent lower
performance and have higher ow volatilities and portfolio concentrations. The
predictability is also stronger among rms overweighted by mutual fund industry.
In order to test the year-end eect documented by Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway
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[2011], who nd that winner funds are more likely to use derivatives to reduce risks
for managerial incentives at year-end, I split sample periods into non-year-end and
year-end (the last quarter of year) when I sort rms by their fund holders' past
performances. In the row "Year-end", I sort rms by the average of their fund
holders' up-to-date returns during the year adjusted for investment category. The
predictability is concentrated among rms held by winner funds at year-end, con-
sistent with the hypothesis.
To test Hypothesis 5, I use TED spread as a proxy for intermediary funding liq-
uidity constraint. TED spread is related with dealers' risk aversion and eective risk-
free rate. Data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis. I split the sample
period into three sub-periods (Low, Medium, and High) based on the level of TED
spread and run monthly cross-sectional regression ri,t+1 = αt + γtHHIi,t + θtXi,t + εi,t+1
among each sub-period.
Panel B in Table 1.6 reports the coecients of HHI in the three sub-periods.
The negative predictability of HHI disappears in low TED spread period. As TED
spread increases, the coecients become signicant. This pattern is consistent with
the story that price impact is stronger during periods in which intermediaries suer
tighter funding liquidity constraint.
To test Hypothesis 6, 7, and 8 regarding option unhedgeable risk, I sort rms
into three groups at each month t, respectively, by: rm i's idiosyncratic volatility,
estimated from Fama-French three-factor model, as a proxy for stochastic-volatility
risk; absolute value of the skewness of rm i's stock return as a proxy for jump risk,
because both positive and negative jumps make options dicult to hedge; Amihud
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illiquidity measure as a proxy for high-frequency delta hedging cost. I run the same
Fama-MacBeth regression as before. Results in Panel C display patterns consistent
with Hypothesis 6, 7, and 8: the negative predictability of HHI is stronger among
rms with higher idiosyncratic volatilities, jump risks, and stock market illiquidities.
Overall, the option return predictability of HHI displays patterns consistent
with ndings in related literature, adding more validities for HHI being a proxy for
hedging demands.
1.4 HHI and the Price of Systematic and Idiosyncratic Variance
This section estimates the systematic and idiosyncratic VRP in equity option
markets and shows that HHI is negatively related with each component. I rst show
that systematic variance risk is underpriced in equity options relative to index op-
tions, which helps explain the puzzle that equity options seem cheaper than index
options. The underpricing is related to dierent demand patterns and composi-
tions of traders in index and equity option markets, and is more pronounced among
rms with lower HHI. In order to examine how HHI aects the idiosyncratic VRP,
I construct a rm-level idiosyncratic VIX portfolio, whose payo approximates the
realized idiosyncratic variance of the rm's stock return. I nd that HHI negatively
predicts cross-sectional idiosyncratic VIX returns. Intuitively, for rms with higher
HHI, some institutional investors are more likely to take large positions in those
rms. They are more sensitive to both systematic and idiosyncratic variances and
pay higher insurance premiums, leading to more negative systematic and idiosyn-
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cratic VRP.
1.4.1 Decomposing VRP in equity option markets
Assuming that individual stock returns follow the market model, I can decom-
pose a stock's total VRP into systematic and idiosyncratic components. I start by
estimating the following market-model regression for each rm i:
rStocki,t = αi + βirm,t + εi,t, (1.4)
where: rStocki,t is the stock return of rm i at month t; rm,t is the market return,
proxied by S&P 500 Index return; αi and βi are coecients to be estimated for each
rm i.




where: RVi,t+1 is rm i's realized variance at month t + 1; RVm,t+1 is the real-
ized variance of S&P 500 Index return; RVε,i,t+1 is the realized variance of rm i's
idiosyncratic return.
At the end of month t, I take conditional variance of (1.4) under the risk-
neutral measure:




m,t + V IX
2
ε,i,t, (1.6)
where: V IX2i,t is the expectation of rm i's total variance at month t + 1 under
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risk-neutral measure; V IX2m,t is the risk-neutral expectation of market variance at
month t+ 1; V IX2ε,i,t is the expectation of rm i's idiosyncratic variance.
Equation (1.5) and (1.6) imply
RVi,t+1 − V IX2i,t
V IX2i,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
V RPi,t+1
= β2i
RVm,t+1 − V IX2m,t
V IX2i,t
+
RVε,i,t+1 − V IX2ε,i,t
V IX2i,t
. (1.7)
The term on the left-hand side is rm i's variance risk premium at month t + 1,
denoted as V RPi,t+1. Carr and Wu [2009] use it to measure VRP. To recover the
systematic and idiosyncratic components from V RPi,t+1, I rewrite (1.7) as
RVi,t+1 − V IX2i,t














RVε,i,t+1 − V IX2ε,i,t
V IX2ε,i,t
= wi,t ·
RVm,t+1 − V IX2m,t
V IX2m,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systematic V RP (SV RP )
+(1− wi,t) ·
RVε,i,t+1 − V IX2ε,i,t
V IX2ε,i,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic V RP (IV RP )






; SV RP is the systematic variance risk premium embedded
in equity options; IV RP is the idiosyncratic variance risk premium. The second
equality holds because V IX2ε,i,t = V IX
2
i,t − β2i V IX2m,t, by (1.6).
I estimate the systematic and idiosyncratic VRP in equity option markets by
running a monthly cross-sectional regression, as follows:
V RPi,t+1 = λ0,t+1 + λ1,t+1wi,t + εi,t+1. (1.9)
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The independent variable in (1.9) is wi,t. To avoid forward-looking bias, βi,t is
estimated by running rolling regression (1.4) at the end of each month t, using
the past year daily stock return.22 V IX2m,t and V IX
2
i,t are calculated following
the construction of VIX portfolio. According to (1.8), the price of systematic and
idiosyncratic variance risk equal
Price of Systematic V ariance = λ0 + λ1,
P rice of Idiosyncratic V ariance = λ0,
(1.10)
where: λ0 and λ1 are the time-series averages of λ0,t and λ1,t, estimated from (1.9).
Panel A of Table 1.7 reports coecients of the regression:
ri,t+1 = λ0,t+1 + λ1,t+1 · wi,t + εi,t+1, (1.11)
where ri,t+1 is rm i's one-month-ahead VIX return.
According to (1.10), the price of systematic variance risk equals
λ0 + λ1 = −11.2% + 23.5% = 12.3%.
λ0,t+1 + λ1,t+1 and index VIX return have a correlation of 0.57. A t-test shows
that λ0,t+1 + λ1,t+1 is statistically positive. This is contrary to the largely negative
index VIX return.23 A detailed explanation for the dierential pricing is examined
22To ensure the precision of the estimate, I require at least 120 daily observations in the rolling
regression. Changing the rolling window to 6 month or using whole sample realized βi does not
change the qualitative results.
23To make sure that the result is not caused by using rms not included in the S&P 500 Index,
I rerun the above regression with only rms included in the index each month. The price of
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in the next section. If the price of systematic variance embedded in equity options,
V IX2m,t, is priced the same as that in index options, λ0 + λ1 should be negative
instead of positive.
The underpricing of systematic variance risk in equity option markets oers
an alternative explanation for the stylized fact that individual rms' VRP are less
negative than index VRP. To reconcile the dierence, Driessen, Maenhout, and
Vilkov [2009] decompose index VRP into VRP of constituent rms and correlation
risk premium. They assume no-arbitrage between index and equity option markets
and attribute the largely negative index VRP to correlation risk premium. The
no-arbitrage assumption can be strong given the documented mispricings in option
market: Eisdorfer, Sadka, and Zhdanov [2017] document that options held from one
expiration date to the next achieve signicantly lower returns when there are four
versus ve weeks between expiration dates because of investor inattention to exact
expiration date; Jones and Shemesh [2018] nd that option returns are signicantly
lower over nontrading periods because of the incorrect treatment of stock return
variance over those periods; Lemmon and Ni [2014] nd that individual investors'
sentiment aects the demand and pricing for equity options but not for index op-
tions. The no-arbitrage assumption can be questionable, especially in equity option
markets given their large presence of less sophisticated individual investors.
Instead, this paper argues that individual rm's VRP would have been more
negative if systematic variance risk has the same price in the two markets. In
systematic variance is estimated to be 11.15%, close to 12.3%. I also use the method in Fama
and MacBeth [1973] to estimate the systematic VRP: For each rm, I run a full-sample monthly
time-series regression of equity VIX returns on index VIX return and get each rm's exposure;
then I estimate systematic VRP via cross-sectional regression. The estimate equals 9.08%.
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a related paper, Barras and Malkhozov [2016] nd that systematic variance risk
has two prices in index option market and stock market because of the nancial
constraints faced by intermediaries in supplying index options. This paper focuses on
the dierence between index option and equity option markets, which are supposed
to be more closely related.
The intercept λ0 equals −11.2%, with a t-statistic of -7.24, suggesting that in-
vestors pay a premium for idiosyncratic variance. This is consistent with the notion
that options on stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility attract high demand and
that constrained nancial intermediaries charge extra compensation for supplying
these options because of their high hedging costs (Cao and Han [2013]). Ang et
al. (2006) nd that idiosyncratic volatility negatively predicts future cross-sectional
stock returns. Cao and Han [2013] nd that idiosyncratic volatility negatively pre-
dicts future cross-sectional delta-hedged option returns. My nding complements
the literature by showing that idiosyncratic variance has a negative price in equity
option markets.
This section documents a positive price of systematic variance and a negative
price of idiosyncratic variance in equity option markets. The two combined conform
to a close-to-zero and much less negative rm-level VRP. The nding that systematic
variance risk has two prices in index and equity option markets helps explain why
equity options seem cheaper than index options.
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1.4.2 HHI and the price of systematic variance risk
This section explores how HHI is related with the price of systematic vari-
ance risk embedded in equity options. I make a conjecture that the underpricing of
systematic variance risk in equity option markets is related with dierent demand
patterns and compositions of traders in index and equity option markets: Equity op-
tions are less used for hedging purpose than index options are; In addition, Lemmon
and Ni [2014] nd that individual investors have a larger impact in equity option
markets than in index option market. I hypothesize that in equity option markets,
compared with less sophisticated individual investors who are more likely to chase
a rm's idiosyncratic variance for lottery-like payos,24 institutional investors who
take large positions in the rm, i.e. rm with high HHI, pay more attention to
systematic variance, which will be priced more consistently with that embedded in
index options. According to the hypothesis, systematic VRP inferred from rms
with higher HHI should be closer to that inferred from index options.
To test the hypothesis, I estimate systematic VRP from groups of rms with
dierent HHI. Each month, I rst rank rms into three groups by their size and
further sort each size group into three subgroups by HHI. Within each size-HHI
subgroup, I run regression (1.11), and report prices of systematic variance risk in
Panel B of Table 1.7.
24See Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink [2010] and Boyer and Vorkink [2014] for details about the link
between a rm's idiosyncratic volatility and skewness in stock and option markets. Boyer, Mitton,
and Vorkink [2010] nd that a rm's idiosyncratic volatility strongly and positively predicts the
idiosyncratic skewness of its future stock returns. Boyer and Vorkink [2014] nd a strong negative
relationship between skewness and equity option returns and attribute it to the demand pressure
caused by investors' preference for lottery-like options.
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Within each size tercile, the estimated price is decreasing as HHI increases.
The price inferred from HHI 3, the group of rms with the highest HHI, is not
statistically positive and closer to that estimated from index options. The pattern
is consistent with the hypothesis and suggests that the underpricing of systematic
variance is more pronounced among rms with lower HHI.
Size and HHI are negatively correlated with each other. However, they both
have a negative relation with systematic VRP. Therefore, the pattern in Panel B is
not caused by the correlation between size and HHI. The two variables capture dif-
ferent information contents related to systematic VRP embedded in equity options.
1.4.3 Controlling for variance-related option mispricing
This section examines whether the prot of trading strategy exploiting sys-
tematic variance risk mispricings can be explained by other variance-related option





, to measure rm i's degree
of systematic variance risk mispricing. The higher wi,t is, the larger is the proportion
of systematic variance in rm i's total variance under risk-neutral measure.
I use a double-sort procedure to control for variance mispricing measures in
equity options documented by previous studies. Goyal and Saretto [2009] nd that
the log dierence between historical realized volatility and ATM implied volatility
predicts cross-sectional option returns. Their option portfolios consist of only ATM




),25 where RVi,t−12,t is rm i's historical variance estimated
25Using their original measure yields stronger results.
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using daily stock return over the past 12 months. I call it HV − IV . Another
measure is idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) documented by Cao and Han [2013].
Each month, I rst sort rms into quintiles based on HV − IV or IVOL and
then sort each quintile by wi,t. All portfolios are equally weighted. Alpha is calcu-
lated from the Fama-French 5 factors (Fama and French [2015]), stock momentum,
and index VIX return. Table A1.3 presents average monthly returns. In Panel A,
after controlling for HV − IV , the strategy that long VIX portfolios of rms with
high wi,t and short those with low wi,t delivers a signicantly positive return in every
quintile. The alpha is even higher than the raw return, because the trading strategy
is constructed to have a positive exposure to the negative index VIX return. Panel
B shows the result controlling for IVOL. The pattern is the same as in Panel A.
In unreported diagnostics, I use a Fama-MacBeth regression to check whether
wi,t can be explained by rm characteristics. After controlling for characteristics,
the coecient estimate of wi,t remains highly signicant with a t-statistic of 6.50.
It cannot be subsumed by rm characteristics.
1.4.4 HHI and the price of idiosyncratic variance risk
This section examines the relation between HHI and idiosyncratic VRP. I
construct a rm-level idiosyncratic VIX portfolio, whose payo approximates the
realized idiosyncratic variance of the rm's stock return. Then I use Fama-MacBeth
regression to examine the cross-sectional relation between HHI and idiosyncratic
VRP.
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Firm i's idiosyncratic VIX portfolio is constructed by long 1 unit of rm i's
VIX portfolio and short β2i,t unit of index VIX portfolio. Based on equation (1.5),
the portfolio payo should approximate rm i's idiosyncratic variance over the next
month.
I rst check the tracking performance of idiosyncratic VIX portfolios. Table
A1.4 reports summary statistics of idiosyncratic VIX return. Idiosyncratic VIX
returns are quite volatile with a monthly standard deviation of 176.1%, twice of
that of VIX returns. To avoid extreme observations, I apply the following ltering
rules at each month: Delete rms with negative idiosyncratic VIX prices and rms
with idiosyncratic VIX price below the 5 and above the 95 percentile. The average
idiosyncratic VIX return is 10.86%, close to the average idiosyncratic VSR, dened
as







V IX2i,t,T − β2i,tV IX2m,t,T
− 1, (1.12)
where: βi,t,T is the realized β of rm i during period t to T by running regression
(1.4); βi,t in denominator is rolling 1 year β; ri,u is rm i's stock return on day u;
rm,u is index return on day u; V IX
2
m,t,T and V IX
2
i,t,T are the prices of index and
rm i's VIX portfolio at month t.
To calculate time-series correlation between idiosyncratic VIX return and id-
iosyncratic VSR for each rm, I require rms to have at least 30 observations. The
average correlation equals 0.62. The median correlation is 0.72. The tracking error
could be diversied away by forming equally weighted (EW) portfolio each month.
The correlation between the EW idiosyncratic VIX return and VSR equals 0.79.
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The average of idiosyncratic VIX return is positive. This seems to contradict
the negative price of idiosyncratic variance documented before. The seeming con-
tradiction is caused by the underpriced systematic variance risk in equity option
markets: When investors long systematic variance embedded in equity options at a
lower price and short systematic variance at a higher price by selling index options,
they earn a positive return. This cross-market arbitrage turns negative idiosyncratic
VRP into positive portfolio returns.
Table 1.8 reports the results. In a cross-sectional regression, HHI negatively
predicts one-month ahead idiosyncratic VIX returns. The coecient of HHI is -0.397
with a t-statistic of -5.90. It remains highly signicant after controlling for other
predictors. The negative predictability suggests that for rms in which institutional
investors take more concentrated positions, institutions are more sensitive to those
rms' idiosyncratic variances and pay a higher premium on option markets to hedge.
1.5 Trading Strategies
This section explores the protabilities of two trading strategies. The rst
strategy sorts rms by mutual fund HHI. The second strategy sorts rms by wi,t to
exploit the systematic variance risk mispricing. I implement the two strategies with
both VIX portfolios and delta-hedged call and put options.
At each month, I sort rms into deciles by −HHIi,t or wi,t and equally weight
rms. I sort by negative HHI in order to generate an increasing pattern of returns.
Alpha is calculated from Fama-French 5 factors, stock momentum, and S&P 500
43
Index VIX return. To account for the potential nonnormality of option returns, I
also report the 99% bootstrap condence intervals for the risk-adjusted long-short
portfolio returns. Table 1.9 presents average monthly returns.
Panel A reports returns sorted by −HHIi,t. Monthly decile returns of VIX
portfolios increase from -10.87% to -0.91% as −HHIi,t increases. A long-short trad-
ing strategy generates a monthly return of 9.96% with a t-statistic of 5.89. The
annual Sharpe Ratio is 1.26. Trading delta-hedged call and put also yields signi-
cantly positive returns, equal to 0.88% and 1.17%, respectively.
Panel B reports returns sorted by wi,t. Monthly decile returns of VIX portfolios
monotonically increase from -13.3% to 4.21% as wi,t increases. A long-short trading
strategy generates a monthly return of 17.5% with a t-statistic of 8.23. The Sharpe
Ratio is 1.76. The alpha is 20.8%, even higher than the raw return. This is because
the trading strategy has a positive exposure to the index VIX return, which is largely
negative. Trading delta-hedged call and put also yields signicantly positive returns,
equal to 1.50% and 1.75%, respectively.
For previous results, I assume that options can be bought and sold at the
midpoint of bid and ask quotes. To take into account the costs associated with
buying or selling options, I assume the eective option spread equals 50%, 75%,
and 100% of the quoted spread. Eective spread is dened as twice the dierence
between the actual execution price and the midpoint at the time of order entry.
The column "MidP" in Table A1.5 corresponds to zero eective spread, i.e., options
are traded at midpoint. An eective-to-quoted spread ratio of 50% is equivalent to
paying half of quoted bid-ask spread. De Fontnouvelle, Fishe, and Harris [2003] and
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Mayhew [2002] show that the typical spread ratio is less than 0.5. Muravyev and
Pearson [2019] show that eective spreads of traders who time executions are less
than 40% of the conventional measures.
Table A1.5 examines the impact of option bid-ask spreads on the protability
of strategies. Returns in "All" columns are calculated using all rms at that month.
Returns in "Low Bid-Ask Spread" columns are calculated using rms with percent-
age bid-ask spread lower than the median bid-ask spread of that month, in order to
avoid illiquid options.
In Panel A, the monthly return of long-short VIX portfolios sorted by −HHIi,t
becomes insignicant under 50% ratio case. Delta-hedged ATM call return remains
signicant when the ratio is 50% and even signicant under the 75% case if only
liquid options with lower-than-median bid-ask spreads are traded. The strategy is
most protable for puts: When the ratio is 75%, the mean return is 0.22%, with a
t-statistic of 2.46; by only trading liquid options, the mean return after full bid-ask
spread is 0.32%, with a t-statistic of 3.02.
In Panel B, when the ratio increases to 50%, the monthly return of long-
short VIX portfolios sorted by wi,t decreases to 6.61%, with a t-statistic of 3.15.
It becomes insignicant when the ratio raises to 75%. By only trading rms with
lower-than-median bid-ask spreads, the monthly VIX return remains signicant at
6.62%, with a t-statistic of 2.52, under the 75% case. Delta-hedged ATM call and
put returns remain highly signicant under the 75% case. By trading only liquid
options, returns are statistically positive even when the whole bid-ask spreads are
considered.
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To conclude, option bid-ask spreads reduce the prots of trading strategies
but do not eliminate them at reasonable estimates of eective spreads. By avoid-
ing illiquid options, most strategies deliver statistically positive returns when the
eective-to-quoted spread ratio equals 75%.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper nds that institutional stock holdings negatively predict cross-
sectional option returns. Evidence is consistent with a hedging and demand pressure
channel: In a simple model, HHI of stock holdings is proportional to stock holders'
aggregate hedging demand for options against variance risks originated from their
stock positions. For stocks with more concentrated ownership, some institutions
are more likely to overweight them and demand more of their options to hedge. To
absorb the order imbalances, dealers sell options and charge higher prices, leading to
lower option returns. Using option holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds, I nd that
the negative predictability of HHI comes from funds that overweight the rm relative
to their benchmark indexes and funds that use equity options, especially those long
puts. I also document a positive correlation between funds' stock concentration and
their option share in the same rms, directly linking rm's HHI with their fund
holders' option demand.
I also validate the channel by testing related theories in the literature. Theories
suggest that the predictability should be stronger when mutual funds are more
likely to use options to hedge and among rms with higher option price impacts.
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Consistent with predictions, I nd that the negative predictability is stronger among
rms with mutual fund holders that suer recent lower performance and have higher
ow volatilities and portfolio concentrations, among rms overweighted by mutual
funds, as well as among rms with higher option market making costs.
I decompose rm's total VRP into systematic and idiosyncratic components.
The price of systematic variance risk estimated from equity options is positive,
instead of negative as that implied by S&P 500 Index options. This dierential
pricing is more pronounced among rms with lower HHI and can help explain the
puzzle that individual rm's VRP is less negative than that of the index. This
pattern is related with dierent demand patterns and compositions of traders in
index and equity option markets: institutional investors who hold concentrated
positions in rms with higher HHI are more sensitive to systematic variance, which
will be priced more consistently with that embedded in index options.
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This gure plots the monthly index VIX return (blue solid line) and variance swap return (red
dashed line) dened in (1.3). The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2017.
Markers indicate the returns for the October 1997 Mini Crash caused by the Asian economic
crisis, the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), the March 2000 Dot-com
Bubble, the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers (Lehman), the April 2010 Greece Debt Crisis,
and the August 2011 Black Monday following the downgrade of the U.S. sovereign debt.
Figure 1.1: Index VIX Return and Variance Swap Return
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In a Fama-MacBeth regression, I regress rms' equity VIX returns on lagged n (1 to 12) month
HHI constructed from option funds in Morningstar dataset, controlling for other option return
predictors in Table 1.3. The gure plots the coecient estimates of HHI (solid blue line) and
the 95% condence intervals (dashed black lines).
Figure 1.2: Option Return Predictability of Lagged HHI Option Fund
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2017. I pick all optionable rms in
the OptionMetrics Database. There are 138,339 rm-month observations in total. Number
of Firms Each Month is the number of rms each month in my sample. Number of Option
Contracts is the number of option contracts used to construct equity VIX portfolio for each rm.
Index (Equity) VIX Return is the actual return of the index (equity) VIX portfolio. Equity
VSR (Variance Swap Return) is dened as the realized variance of equity return divided by
the price of equity VIX portfolio minus 1. EW (Equally Weighted) Equity VIX Return is the
cross-sectional average of equity VIX Return at each month. βIndex V IX Return is the rm-level
exposure of equity VIX return to index VIX return. Corr(Equity VIX Return,Equity VSR) is
the rm level time series correlation between equity VIX return and equity VSR. Corr(Equity
VIX Return,Stock Return) is the rm level time-series correlation between the equity VIX
return and stock return. HHI Mutual Fund (Institution) is the Herndahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of mutual fund (institution) ownership of the rm's stocks. It measures the ownership
concentration among mutual funds (institutions) that are shareholders of the company.
Mean Std 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Panel A: VIX return.
Number of Firms Each Month 526 214 260 335 503 700 831
Number of Option Contracts 6.41 4.53 4.00 4.00 4.00 8.00 10.00
Index VIX Return(%) -23.24 72.66 -67.99 -56.43 -37.18 -13.80 18.44
Equity VIX Return(%) -5.13 91.98 -62.01 -45.20 -21.39 13.83 68.07
EW Equity VIX Return(%) -4.82 28.13 -30.20 -22.25 -11.30 4.05 25.44
βIndex V IX Return 0.33 0.36 -0.02 0.15 0.31 0.50 0.74
Corr(Equity VIX Return,Equity VSR) 0.75 0.31 0.35 0.68 0.88 0.95 0.98
Corr(Equity VIX Return,Stock Return) -0.26 0.23 -0.51 -0.41 -0.29 -0.13 0.04
Panel B: Herndahl-Hirschman Index.
HHI Mutual Fund 0.139 0.196 0.024 0.035 0.065 0.142 0.343
HHI Institution 0.057 0.069 0.026 0.032 0.042 0.058 0.089
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Table 1.2: HHI and Equity VIX Returns
This table reports the results of cross-sectional regression:
ri,t+1 = αt + γtHHIi,t + θtXi,t + εi,t+1, where ri,t+1 is the one-month-ahead equity VIX
return of rm i. HHI Mutual Fund (Institution) is the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of
mutual fund (institution) ownership of the rm's stocks. Holdings of Mutual Fund (Institution)
are calculated as the rm's total shares held by mutual funds (institutions) divided by the
total number of shares outstanding. The associated t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2017.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HHI Mutual Fund -0.240∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(-7.17) (-6.41) (-5.19)
Holdings of Mutual Fund 0.132∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(1.90) (3.57)
HHI Institution -0.396∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(-7.11) (-6.41) (-2.87)
Holdings of Institution 0.007 -0.075∗∗∗
(0.39) (-3.02)
Intercept -0.024 -0.038∗ -0.025 -0.025 0.004
(-1.24) (-1.69) (-1.36) (-0.96) (0.15)
Adj. R2 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.008
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Table 1.3: Robustness of HHI
This table reports the average coecients of monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of equity
V IX returns in one month ahead on the latest available institutional and mutual fund hold-
ings. Control variables include idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL, Cao and Han (2013)), log dier-
ence between historical volatility and equity V IX (HV-VIX, modied from Goyal and Saretto
(2009)), short-term stock return reversal (RETt−1,t), momentum (RETt−12,t−1), long-term
stock return reversal (RETt−36,t−12), size (Ln(ME)), book-to-market (Ln(BM)), risk-neutral
skewness of stock returns (RN Skew, Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003)), rolling 1 year skew-
ness and kurtosis of stock returns (Rolling Skew and Kurt), analyst dispersion, cash holdings
(CH), protability (Prot), new issues (Cao, Han, Tong, and Zhan (2017)), Amihud illiquidity
measure over the previous month (Amihud (2002)), and the percentage bid-ask spread of the
option portfolio (Option Bid-Ask Spread). To check the robustness, results using delta-hedged
ATM call and put option gains until maturity (calculated as Bakshi and Kapadia (2003)) are
also reported. The associated heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2017.
Equity VIX Return Delta Call Delta Put
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HHI Mutual Fund -0.210∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-4.46) (-3.52) (-3.32) (-4.54)
Holdings of Mutual Fund 0.208∗∗ 0.168 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(2.30) (1.56) (2.62) (3.78)
HHI Institution -0.279∗∗∗ -0.127
(-4.01) (-1.63)
Holdings of Institution 0.042∗∗ 0.015
(2.33) (0.56)
IVOL -1.273∗∗∗ -1.315∗∗∗ -1.348∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(-3.22) (-3.18) (-3.33) (-6.40) (-7.32)
HV-VIX 0.328∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(11.16) (11.25) (11.09) (11.92) (13.94)
RETt−1,t -0.121
∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.008∗∗∗
(-2.92) (-2.92) (-2.84) (-1.12) (-3.38)
RETt−12,t−1 0.039
∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗
(2.90) (2.79) (2.74) (1.17) (2.54)
RETt−36,t−12 0.026
∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗
(3.07) (3.15) (2.97) (1.06) (1.76)
Ln(ME) -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000
(-0.18) (0.08) (-0.36) (-0.52) (1.01)
Ln(BM) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(3.12) (2.61) (2.78) (2.30) (2.40)
RN Skew 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
(2.11) (2.09) (2.14) (-5.28) (1.40)
Rolling Skew 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.21) (0.27) (0.30) (0.01) (0.13)
Rolling Kurt -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(-7.06) (-7.32) (-7.09) (-6.74) (-7.66)
Analyst Dispersion -0.028∗ -0.026∗ -0.026 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(-1.81) (-1.65) (-1.63) (-2.68) (-2.70)
CH 0.044∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.046∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(2.11) (2.32) (2.19) (-0.11) (-0.24)
Prot -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.67) (-0.81) (-0.73) (-0.49) (-0.72)
Issue 0.046 0.049∗ 0.042 0.001 0.001
(1.56) (1.68) (1.45) (0.61) (0.63)
Amihud 0.517 -0.647 0.230 -0.360∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗
(0.24) (-0.30) (0.11) (-2.50) (-3.50)
Option Bid-Ask Spread 0.024 0.017 0.015 0.009∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.62) (0.45) (0.41) (2.32) (2.03)
Intercept -0.048 -0.079 -0.030 -0.003 -0.009∗∗
(-0.57) (-1.04) (-0.37) (-0.78) (-2.30)
Adj. R2 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.087 0.085
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Table 1.4: HHI and Risk Proles of Option Funds and Non-option Funds
This table examines the cross-sectional explanatory power of ownership concentration of option
funds and non-option funds on equity VIX returns, respectively. In each column, I control for
the corresponding share proportions owned by each fund category. HHI MStar is constructed
using the holdings of all U.S. equity funds in Morningstar dataset. HHI Non MStar is con-
structed using the holdings of funds in S12 but not covered by Morningstar dataset. HHI
Overweight (Underweight) is constructed using the holdings of funds in Morningstar dataset
that overweight (underweight) the rm relative to their benchmarks. HHI Option Fund is con-
structed using only funds that use equity options. HHI Put Fund is constructed using funds
that use put options. HHI Call Fund is constructed using funds that only use calls and never use
puts. HHI Put Short is constructed using put funds that only short puts but never long puts.
HHI Put Long is constructed using put funds that long puts. HHI Call Short is constructed
using call funds that only short calls but never long calls. HHI Call Long is constructed using
call funds that long calls. The associated t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HHI MStar -0.086∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.053
(-3.67) (-3.10) (-1.64)






HHI Option Fund -0.049∗∗ -0.003 -0.098∗∗∗
(-2.53) (-0.11) (-5.00)
HHI Put Fund -0.074∗∗∗
(-3.31)
HHI Call Fund 0.029∗
(1.67)
HHI Put Long -0.071∗∗∗
(-4.23)
HHI Put Short -0.020
(-1.35)
HHI Call Long -0.015
(-0.99)
HHI Call Short 0.018
(1.13)
Intercept -0.057∗∗ -0.044∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.044∗ -0.023 -0.037∗ -0.005
(-2.40) (-1.71) (-2.12) (-1.77) (-1.01) (-1.74) (-0.18)
Adj. R2 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.013
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Table 1.5: Fund Option Market Activity and Option Funds HHI
This table reports the results of quarterly panel regression: FOMAi,t = αi+γHHIi,t+δXi,t+
εi,t, where: FOMAi,t is mutual fund option market activity of rm i at the end of quarter
t, dened as the aggregate funds holdings at rm i's option market scaled by the total dollar
open interest of rm i's option market. O/Si,t is rm i's option/stock dollar volume, dened
as option dollar open interest scaled by the stock's monthly dollar trading volume. I multiply
O/S by 100 to convert it to percent. Control variables Xi,t, such as Ln(ME), Ln(BM), IVOL,
RETt−1,t, RETt−12,t−1 and Analyst Dispersion, are the same as in Table 1.3. VOL is the past-
1-month total volatility of stock returns. Analyst Number is the number of I/B/E/S analysts
making one-year forecasts on the rm. Index Returnt−6,t is the return of S&P 500 Index over
the past 6 months. Index VIX is the S&P 500 Index VIX at the end of month. Index Skew is
the risk-neutral skewness of S&P 500 Index at the end of month. Standard errors are clustered
at rm and month level. The associated t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to
December 2015.
Panel A: Sort by HHI Option Fund.
1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High)
FOMA (%) 0.38 0.75 1.00 1.70 2.08 2.26 2.78 3.55 4.38 5.34
Panel B: Panel regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
FOMA FOMA O/S
HHI Option Fund 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.4669∗∗∗
(4.51) (2.60) (2.73)
















Analyst Number 0.0001 -0.0078
(0.52) (-1.27)
Analyst Dispersion 0.0002 0.0047
(1.19) (1.11)
Index Returnt−6,t -0.0025 -0.4074
∗
(-0.32) (-1.79)
Index VIX 0.0002 -0.0071∗
(1.36) (-1.75)
Index Skew -0.0004 0.0785∗
(-0.37) (1.84)
Observations 19142 17477 17448
adj. R2 0.50 0.53 0.53
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes54
Table 1.6: Option Demand Pressure and Price Impact
This table reports the coecients of HHI in the monthly Fama-MacBeth regression:
ri,t+1 = αt + γtHHIi,t + θtXi,t + εi,t+1.
ri,t+1 is rm i's VIX return. Xi,t is a set of control variables as those in Table 1.3. In Panel A, I
sort rms into three groups at each month t, respectively, by the average of their fund holders':
past quarter returns adjusted for investment category, past-12-month fund ow volatilities,
and portfolio concentrations. To test the year-end hypothesis, I split sample periods into non-
year-end and year-end periods when I sort rms by past fund returns. I also sort rms by the
deviation of their weights in mutual fund industry from market weights (Benchmark Deviation).
Panel B reports the coecients among three sub-periods sorted by TED spread. In Panel C,
I sort rms by three stock characteristics associated with option unhedgeable risk: rm i's
idiosyncratic volatility, absolute value of the skewness of stock return, and Amihud illiquidity
measure. The associated t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2017.
Panel A: Mutual fund characteristics.
Low Medium High
Fund Past Performance -0.424∗∗∗ -0.205 -0.149
(-3.08) (-1.53) (-1.37)
Non-year-end -0.559∗∗∗ -0.175 -0.100
(-3.24) (-1.19) (-0.73)
Year-end 0.161 -0.200 -0.352∗∗
(0.63) (-0.69) (-2.02)
Fund Flow Volatility -0.056 -0.164 -0.465∗∗∗
(-0.53) (-1.10) (-3.59)
Benchmark Deviation -0.194 -0.178∗ -0.200∗∗
(-1.24) (-1.92) (-2.54)
Fund Portfolio Concentration -0.136 -0.252 -0.275∗∗
(-0.94) (-1.28) (-2.38)
Panel B: TED spread.
Low Medium High
TED spread -0.018 -0.328∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗
(-0.30) (-4.01) (-3.14)
Panel C: Stock characteristics.
Low Medium High
Stock Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.107 -0.173 -0.206∗∗
(-0.83) (-1.67) (-2.19)
|Skew| 0.018 -0.276∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗
(0.22) (-2.70) (-2.82)
Amihud Illiquidity -0.288∗ -0.200 -0.220∗∗∗
(-1.90) (-1.30) (-3.15)
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Table 1.7: Price of Systematic Variance in Equity Option Markets
Panel A reports the average coecients of the monthly Fama-MacBeth regression,
ri,t+1 = λ0,t+1 + λ1,t+1 · wi,t + εi,t+1, where ri,t+1 is the one-month-ahead V IX return and





. Results using delta-hedged ATM call and put option gains until
maturity (calculated as in Bakshi and Kapadia (2003)) are also reported. Panel B reports the
price of systematic variance risk (in percent) inferred from subgroups of rms with dierent
sizes and mutual fund HHI. Each month, I rst rank rms into three groups by their size; then
rms within each size group are further sorted into three subgroups by HHI. I run the cross-
sectional regression in Panel A, using only rms in each size-HHI subgroup. The associated
t-statistics are in parentheses. *** denotes signicance at 1%. The sample period is from Jan.
1996 to Dec. 2017.
Panel A: Price of systematic and idiosyncratic variances.
VIX Return Delta-hedged Call Delta-hedged Put





Adj. R2 0.017 0.014 0.017
Panel B: HHI and price of systematic risk.
HHI 1 (Low) HHI 2 HHI 3 (High)
Size 1 (Low) 24.14 20.72 16.08
(2.61) (2.39) (1.00)
Size 2 19.18 13.41 11.01
(3.31) (2.13) (1.64)
Size 3 (High) 11.33 12.34 5.16
(2.72) (2.13) (1.11)
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Table 1.8: HHI and Idiosyncratic VIX Returns
This table reports the average coecients of the monthly Fama-MacBeth regression of one-
month-ahead idiosyncratic VIX returns on the latest available independent variables. The
associated t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2017.
(1) (2) (3)
HHI Mutual Fund -0.397∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(-5.90) (-5.55) (-3.57)


































Option Bid-Ask Spread 0.076
(1.13)
Intercept 0.153∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ -0.239
(5.39) (3.81) (-1.63)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.7.1 The Payo of VIX Portfolio
This section follows Heston and Li [2020] and proves that the payo of VIX
portfolio approximately equals the realized variance of stock return.
Eqn (1.1) is a discrete version of the continuous integral in Carr and Madan
(1998), who show that the price of a portfolio whose payo equals to realized variance
of stock return is
V̂ (t, T ) = 2
∫ ∞
0
O(K, t, T )
K2
dK. (A1)
Given stock price S(T ) at expiration, the option payoO(K,T, T ) equalsMax(S(T )−K, 0)
for a call option andMax(K − S(T ), 0) for a put option. In the absence of interme-
diate dividends, integrating these option payos over strike prices (A1) shows the
terminal payo of this idealized VIX portfolio with continuous strikes equals
V̂ (T, T ) = −2 log( S(T )








where rf is the daily risk-free interest rate, which is assumed to be constant over the
life of the option. The rst term in the payo (A2) represents selling two units of the
"log-portfolio". The second term represents a costless static hedge that leverages
(the present value of) two dollars of stock at time t and holds this hedge position
constant until expiration at time T . The combined payo is a U-shaped function
of the stock price, resembling a squared stock return. Therefore, the price of this
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portfolio represents the risk-neutral variance of stock return.
We can further reduce risk of the idealized VIX portfolio by daily-hedging
instead of using a xed static hedge just at time t. This replaces the second term
of (A2) with daily delta hedging of the log-portfolio. Due to the special case of
log-payo (the rst term on right-hand side in (A2)), the delta of the idealized VIX
portfolio is model-free and equals 1/S(t). Thus, to delta-hedge the log-portfolio at
daily frequency, investors need to buy 1/S(t) shares of stock for a price of S(t) and
rebalance the hedging position each day. The payo of this daily hedged idealized
VIX portfolio equals
V̂hedged(T, T ) = −2 log(
S(T )




(r(u)− rf ), (A3)
where r(u) represents the stock return on day u, which is a day between time t and
T . We can replace the stock price in equation (A3) to express the payo in terms
of a telescoping series of daily stock returns r(u) between t and T as follows:









(r(u)− rf ). (A4)
When daily stock returns and risk-free rates are small, a second-order Taylor series
expansion shows that the payo of this daily hedged option portfolio (A4) closely
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approximates the realized variance of stock return over time t to T as follows:
V̂hedged(T, T ) = 2
T∑
u=t+1











Since the daily risk-free rate is very small, the last approximation holds.26 Combine
Equation (A2) and (A5), it is easy to see that the numerator of Equation (1.2)
approximates realized variance.
1.7.2 Model Linking HHI with Aggregate Hedging Demand for VIX
Portfolio
Building on the model in Smith [2019], I derive a positive relation between
HHI and investors' aggregate hedging demand for the rm's VIX portfolio. Here I
will give a brief summary of model setup in Smith [2019] and show how HHI could
be extracted as an empirical proxy for hedging demand. Readers can refer to the
original paper for more details.
It is a single-period model with a continuum of investors indexed on [0, 1] with
CARA utility u(W ) = −e−Wτ . Three assets are traded: a risk-free asset with payo
normalized to one and unlimited supply; a risky asset (stock) that pays o x̃ at the
end of period, with per-capita endowment of z̄; a variance derivative (VIX portfolio)
with payo equal to the stochastic variance Ṽ and 0 net supply. Dene DSi and




(r(u) − rf )2 and
T∑
u=t+1
r(u)2 have a correlation of 1, and the average absolute value of
percentage error is only 0.14%.
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The critical assumption is that both the mean and variance of the stock's
payos are unknown to investors: Given the realizations of two independent random
variables, µ̃ and Ṽ , payo x̃ is normally distributed with mean µ̃ and variance Ṽ :
x̃|µ̃, Ṽ ∼ N(µ̃, Ṽ ). µ̃ is assumed to be Gaussian: µ̃ ∼ N(mµ, σ2µ). Assume that
variance Ṽ ∈ {mV − σV ,mV + σV } with ex-ante equal probabilities.
Each investor i receives both a "mean" signal and a "risk" signal regarding µ̃
and Ṽ , respectively: ϕ̃i = µ̃+ ñ+ ε̃i and η̃i = Ṽ + υ̃ + ẽi, where ε̃i ∼ N(0, σ2ε ), ñ ∼
N(0, σ2n), ẽi ∼ N(0, σ2e), and υ̃ ∼ N(0, σ2υ). To prevent fully revealing equilibrium,
investors have stochastic nontradable endowments of the two components of risk µ̃
and Ṽ . Trader i's endowment of µ̃ equals Z̃µi = z̃µ + z̃µi. Her endowment of Ṽ
equals Z̃V i = z̃V + z̃V i.
To see why investors face variance risk, ignoring endowments for simplicity,
consider investor i's expected utility conditional on Ṽ :
E{−exp[−1
τ
(DSi(x̃− PS) +DDi(Ṽ − PD))]|Φi, Ṽ }
= −exp{−1
τ
[DSi(E(µ̃|Φi)− PS) +DDi(Ṽ − PD)−
D2Si
2τ
(V ar(µ̃|Φi) + Ṽ )]}.
(A6)
In equilibrium, investor i's stock and derivative positions satisfy
DSi = τ
E(x̃|Φi)− PS
V ar(µ̃|Φi) + PD
− Z̃µiV ar(µ̃|Φi)






Pr(Ṽ = mV + σV |Φi)
Pr(Ṽ = mV − σV |Φi)
)− log(−mV + σV + PD
mV + σV − PD










where: Φi ≡ {ϕ̃i, η̃i, Z̃µi, Z̃V i, PS, PD} represent investor i's information set. PS
(PD) is the price of stock (derivative). Investors' hedging demands for the variance
derivative are a quadratic function of their equity holdings, as variance risk has a
higher-order impact on investors' utility.
Above are the results in Smith [2019]. Next, I will show that HHI is propor-
tional to the aggregate hedging demand for the variance derivative and it negatively
predicts VRP.
Since the derivative market is in zero net supply, summing up the second















Combining (A8) and (A9), we can conclude that HHI is proportional to aggregate
hedging demand for variance derivative and is positively related with PD. The
unconditional VRP equals mV
PD
. This means that HHI is negatively related to VRP.
1.7.3 Variable Construction
This section discusses the construction of control variables used in the paper.
 IVOL: idiosyncratic volatility of stock return, estimated from Fama-French 3
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factors using rolling one-month daily data, following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang [2006].
 HV-VIX: dierence between historical volatility, estimated using rolling one-
year daily stock return data, and equity VIX. It is modied from the volatility
deviation measure in Goyal and Saretto [2009].
 RETt−1,t: short-term stock return reversal, calculated as the past month cu-
mulative stock return (Jegadeesh [1990]).
 RETt−12,t−1: stock return momentum, calculated as the cumulative stock re-
turn over the 11 months ending at the end of previous month (Jegadeesh and
Titman [1993]).
 RETt−36,t−12: long-term stock return reversal, calculated as the cumulative
stock return from the past 36 month to the past 12 month (De Bondt and
Thaler [1985]).
 Ln(ME): rm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of
equity at June (Fama and French [1992]).
 Ln(BM): value is measured as the natural logarithm of book equity for the
scal year-end in a calendar year divided by market equity at the end of
December of that year, as in Fama and French [1992].
 RN Skew: risk-neutral skewness of stock returns estimated from a portfolio of
OTM options (Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan [2003]).
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 Rolling Skew: historical stock return skewness, estimated using rolling one-
year daily stock return data.
 Rolling Kurt: historical stock return kurtosis, estimated using rolling one-year
daily stock return data.
 Analyst Dispersion: analyst earnings forecast dispersion, computed as the
standard deviation of annual earnings-per-share forecasts scaled by the abso-
lute value of the average outstanding forecasts (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina
[2002]).
 CH: cash-to-assets ratio, dened as the value of corporate cash holdings over
the value of the rm's total assets (Palazzo [2012]).
 Prot: rm protability, as in Fama and French [2006],calculated as earn-
ings divided by book equity, in which earnings is dened as income before
extraordinary items.
 Issue: new stock issues, as in Ponti and Woodgate [2008], measured as the
change in shares outstanding from 11 months ago.
 Amihud: Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud [2002]) over the past 30 days,
calculated as equation (1) in that paper. Amihud multiplies it by 106 to adjust
the scale. To get a reliable estimate, I require at least 17 observations of daily
stock returns over the past 30 days.
 Option Bid-Ask Spread: for equity VIX portfolio, it is the percentage bid-
ask spread calculated as the absolute bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint
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price of the VIX portfolio; for delta-hedged call (put) portfolio, it is simply
the percentage bid-ask spread of the call (put) option.
 Option Bid-Ask Spread: for equity VIX portfolio, it is the percentage bid-ask
spread calculated as absolute bid-ask spread divided by midpoint price of the
VIX portfolio; for delta-hedged call (put) portfolio, it is simply the percentage
bid-ask spread of the call (put) option.
 Leverage Ratio: rm leverage ratio, calculated as
Book V alue of Debt
Market V alue of Equity +Book V alue of Debt
.
 Treasury Rate: yield on 10-year Treasury. Data is taken from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
 Term Spread: slope of the term structure, dened as ten-year minus two-year
Treasure yields.
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Table A1.1: Robustness Checks
In Panel A, I rst sort rms into quintiles based on rm size at each month and then further
sort each quintile by −HHI Mutual Fund. In Panel B, I rst sort by Fund Number, which is
the number of fund holders holding the rm, and then sort by −HHI Mutual Fund. Firms
are equally weighted. Average monthly returns (in percent) of these portfolios are presented.
In Panel C, I run Fama-MacBeth regression to check the predictability of HHI on future stock
return and variance, respectively. Control variables are the same as those in Table 1.3. The
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1996 to December
2017.
Panel A: Sort rst by size and then −HHI Mutual Fund.
−HHI
Size 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 5-1
1(Low) -12.13 -8.58 -6.67 -5.18 -2.47 9.66
(4.70)
2 -8.80 -6.46 -3.70 -4.23 -2.63 6.17
(2.60)
3 -8.86 -5.84 -5.57 -3.90 -3.27 5.59
(2.98)
4 -7.08 -4.00 -5.77 -2.72 -1.16 5.92
(3.31)
5(High) -4.36 -2.99 -2.41 -2.77 -0.99 3.37
(2.07)
Panel B: Sort rst by Fund Number and then −HHI Mutual Fund.
−HHI
Fund Number 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 5-1
1(Low) -11.82 -9.22 -8.77 -5.41 -7.71 4.10
(2.07)
2 -8.29 -5.35 -3.58 -4.90 -1.30 6.99
(3.93)
3 -7.51 -4.09 -4.83 -3.31 -4.82 2.69
(1.12)
4 -6.30 -4.94 -3.62 -3.37 -4.77 1.53
(0.95)
5(High) -5.49 -2.68 -1.56 -0.70 -0.59 4.90
(2.66)
Panel C: Future stock return and variance.
Stock Returni,t+1 V ariancei,t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HHI Mutual Fund -0.005 0.002
(-0.74) (1.30)
HHI Institution 0.001 -0.002
(0.11) (-0.86)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.114 0.114 0.278 0.275
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Table A1.2: Characteristics of Option and Non-option Funds
This table reports dierences in risk proles between dierent types of funds under dierent
Morningstar investment categories. Users/Total is the proportion of certain type of funds under
a specic Morningstar category. Portfolio Concentration is the Herndahl Index of the fund's
equity portfolio. Alpha is calculated using Carhart 4-factor model. Std, Skew, and Kurt are the
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of fund returns, respectively. All four variables are
calculated using CRSP monthly mutual fund returns. Option - Non is the dierence between
option funds and no option funds. Put (Call) - Non is the dierence between put (call) funds
and no option funds. The p-value associated with a two-sample t-test is reported in parenthesis.
Fund Category Characteristics Option - Non Put - Non Call - Non
Domestic Blend Users/Total 11.03% 5.71% 5.32%
Portfolio Concentration (%) 0.32 (0.02) 0.32 (0.07) 0.32 (0.14)
Alpha (%) 0.01 (0.72) -0.01 (0.86) 0.02 (0.39)
Std (%) 0.15 (0.22) 0.30 (0.12) -0.01 (0.95)
Skew -0.01 (0.85) 0.03 (0.67) -0.05 (0.25)
Kurt 0.35 (0.47) 1.01 (0.25) -0.37 (0.04)
Domestic Growth Users/Total 14.51% 9.08% 5.43%
Portfolio Concentration (%) 0.14 (0.15) 0.13 (0.27) 0.18 (0.32)
Alpha (%) 0.02 (0.40) 0.03 (0.17) -0.01 (0.74)
Std (%) 0.30 (0.03) 0.23 (0.17) 0.40 (0.05)
Skew 0.01 (0.78) 0.02 (0.77) 0.01 (0.93)
Kurt 0.90 (0.03) 0.94 (0.08) 0.83 (0.20)
Domestic Value Users/Total 11.70 % 6.09% 5.61%
Portfolio Concentration (%) 0.28 (0.08) 0.70 (0.01) -0.16 (0.38)
Alpha (%) 0.02 (0.34) 0.03 (0.30) 0.01 (0.77)
Std (%) -0.03 (0.83) -0.02 (0.94) -0.04 (0.79)
Skew -0.01 (0.82) 0.01 (0.92) -0.03 (0.46)
Kurt 0.28 (0.57) 0.80 (0.36) -0.29 (0.26)
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Table A1.3: Double-Sorted VIX Returns
Each month, I rst sort rms into quintiles based onHV −IV or idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL).
HV − IV is dened as log(RVi,t−12,t
V IX2i,t
), where RVi,t−12,t is the realized variance of rm i's stock
return over the past 12 months. IVOL is the rolling 1-month standard deviation of rm's
idiosyncratic return calculated from Fama-French 3-factor model. Firms within each quintile
are further sorted into quintiles based on wi,t. All portfolios are equally weighted. Alpha is
calculated from the Fama and French (2015) 5 factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor,
and S&P 500 Index VIX return in excess of risk-free rate. Average monthly returns of these
portfolios are presented. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Portfolio returns are
expressed in percent. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2017.
Panel A: Sort by HV − IV and then wi,t.
wi,t
Value 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 5-1 Alpha
1(Low) -21.74 -18.28 -14.34 -12.06 -9.55 12.20 17.36
(5.06) (7.28)
2 -9.77 -6.70 -6.27 -4.47 -4.59 5.18 9.05
(2.42) (4.17)
3 -5.35 -2.51 -1.85 -2.93 -0.95 4.40 9.17
(2.21) (4.95)
4 -4.40 -2.94 -1.50 -1.20 2.18 6.58 8.48
(2.80) (3.37)
5(High) -2.80 -0.69 3.17 1.09 7.55 10.35 11.16
(3.82) (3.80)
Panel B: Sort by IVOL and then wi,t.
wi,t
IVOL 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 5-1 Alpha
1(Low) -15.06 -8.28 -7.42 -3.75 -0.09 14.97 16.21
(6.65) (6.68)
2 -12.55 -8.70 -3.47 -2.04 3.86 16.41 19.90
(6.62) (7.94)
3 -9.02 -6.26 -1.73 -1.49 4.14 13.16 13.65
(5.65) (5.38)
4 -9.68 -4.92 -3.44 -2.15 2.94 12.62 14.92
(5.25) (5.76)
5(High) -13.25 -7.73 -4.63 -2.86 0.16 13.41 16.66
(5.59) (6.52)
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Table A1.4: Summary Statistics of Idiosyncratic VIX Return
Idiosyncratic VIX Return is the return of rm's idiosyncratic VIX portfolio. The price of
idiosyncratic VIX portfolio of rm i at month t equals V IX2i,t − β2i,tV IX2M,t. Idiosyncratic
variance swap return (VSR) is dened as the realized idiosyncratic variance divided by the price
of idiosyncratic VIX portfolio minus 1. The equally weighted (EW) idiosyncratic VIX Return
is the cross-sectional average of rms' VIX returns at each month. Corr(Idio VIX Return,Idio
VSR) is the time-series correlation between idiosyncratic VIX return and idiosyncratic VSR for
each rm. When calculating the correlations, rms are required to have at least 30 observations.
Portfolio returns are expressed in percent. The sample period is from January 1996 to December
2017.
Mean Std 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Idio VIX Return (%) 10.86 176.1 -70.88 -47.39 -14.45 37.88 123.6
Idio VSR (%) 11.51 179.2 -70.9 -54.40 -25.54 24.89 108.4
Corr(Idio VIX Return,Idio VSR) 0.62 0.32 0.19 0.51 0.72 0.85 0.92
EW Idio VIX Return (%) 11.71 40.95 -18.65 -6.55 6.31 26.70 51.06
EW Idio VSR (%) 10.04 34.87 -26.91 -11.08 2.15 27.34 49.73
Correlation(EW Idio VIX Return , EW Idio VSR) 0.79
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Table A1.5: Impact of Transaction Costs
Portfolios are formed as in Table 1.9. portfolio returns are computed from the midpoint price
(MidP) and from the eective bid-ask spread (ESPR), estimated to be 50%, 75%, and 100%
of the quoted spread (QSPR). Returns in "Low Bid-Ask Spread" columns are calculated using
rms with percentage bid-ask spread lower than the median bid-ask spread of that month.
Returns in "All" columns are calculated using all rms in that month. Average monthly returns
of these portfolios are presented. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Portfolio returns
are expressed in percent. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2017.
Panel A: Sort by −HHI
All Low Bid-Ask Spread
ESPR/QSPR ESPR/QSPR
MidP 50% 75% 100% MidP 50% 75% 100%
VIX Ret 9.96 -0.40 -6.07 -12.19 8.88 3.07 0.13 -2.85
(5.89) (-0.25) (-3.69) (-7.15) (4.26) (1.50) (0.06) (-1.41)
Delta-hedged Call 0.88 0.22 -0.10 -0.43 0.90 0.51 0.31 0.12
(9.05) (2.34) (-1.10) (-4.52) (7.57) (4.37) (2.71) (1.02)
Delta-hedged Put 1.17 0.54 0.22 -0.10 1.05 0.69 0.50 0.32
(12.69) (5.95) (2.46) (-1.07) (9.66) (6.40) (4.72) (3.02)
Panel B: Sort by wi,t
All Low Bid-Ask Spread
ESPR/QSPR ESPR/QSPR
MidP 50% 75% 100% MidP 50% 75% 100%
VIX Ret 17.50 6.61 0.70 -6.02 15.68 9.66 6.62 3.55
(8.23) (3.15) (0.33) (-2.79) (5.93) (3.68) (2.52) (1.35)
Delta-hedged Call 1.50 0.75 0.39 0.03 1.20 0.85 0.67 0.49
(12.38) (6.35) (3.28) (0.22) (8.51) (6.03) (4.78) (3.51)
Delta-hedged Put 1.75 1.06 0.70 0.35 1.32 0.99 0.83 0.66
(15.69) (9.56) (6.38) (3.16) (9.17) (6.94) (5.80) (4.66)
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Chapter 2: Option Momentum
2.1 Introduction
Early tests of market eciency examined autocorrelation of stock returns
(Fama and French [1988]) as well as predictability of market variance (Canina and
Figlewski [1993], Day and Lewis [1992], Lamoureux and Lastrapes [1993], Fleming
[1998], and Christensen and Prabhala [1998]). While autocorrelation of aggregate
stock market returns is weak, Jegadeesh [1990] and Jegadeesh and Titman [1993]
document strong momentum in the cross-section of U.S. stock returns.1 Moskowitz
and Grinblatt [1999] and Grundy and Martin [2001] extended that cross-sectional
predictability to stock industry returns, and Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel
[2013] extended it to bond returns.2 Predictability in the cross-section implies that
at least some assets have predictable returns. Despite the relevance and success
of momentum strategies across asset classes, the literature has not yet investigated
momentum in the cross-section of option returns across dierent stocks.
In order to investigate option momentum, we need to calculate returns on
1Rouwenhorst [1998] and Grin, Ji, and Martin [2003] conrmed this cross-sectional eect in
other countries.
2Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen [2013] and Jegadeesh and Titman [2011] also review evidence
of momentum across countries, currencies, and commodity futures. Our focus is on the cross-section
of U.S. stock options.
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benchmark option portfolios. The standard published benchmarks for option volatil-
ity are the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) V IX portfolio of S&P 500
index options, and the corresponding equity-V IX portfolios for options on individ-
ual stocks. Carr and Wu [2009] and Britten-Jones and Neuberger [2000] derived
formulas that link V IX to the value of swaps on realized variance. But these for-
mulas are only approximate, because they require a continuum of strike prices, and
because they make additional continuous-time diusion approximations. For em-
pirical work, it is dicult to verify the adequacy of these approximations across
hundreds of dierent stocks.
This paper derives a new formula to calculate exact returns on tradable option
strategies. These strategies employ equity-V IX portfolios of options on individual
stocks, constructed by CBOE's standard "model-free" V IX weighting methodology.
We calculate monthly returns on these portfolios, including daily dynamic hedges in
the underlying stocks. The advantages of our approach are: 1) It provides exact re-
turns on standard benchmark equity-V IX portfolios, 2) It uses a daily "model-free"
hedge that does not require estimating any model parameters, and 3) It explains op-
tion returns with a simple "variance swap" decomposition into realized variance and
option implied-variance. In other words, our methodology is the rst to translate
continuous-time variance swap intuition into exact predictions for discrete option
data.
This paper explores predictability of monthly returns on equity-V IX portfolios
of options across dierent S&P 500 stocks. It nds that positive returns (in the
cross-section) strongly continue for 12 months. Unlike stock returns, option returns
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show no tendency to reverse the gains from momentum (De Bondt and Thaler
[1985, 1987]). Instead, momentum continues periodically for up to 60 months. In
particular, option momentum displays a quarterly pattern of continuation. This
periodic pattern matches the quarterly pattern of stock momentum over the past
year, documented by Heston and Sadka [2008].
Our new methodology allows a variance decomposition of momentum returns.
The cross-section of realized variance is persistent, with a strong quarterly pattern.
But the cross-section of option implied-variance is even more persistent than re-
alized variance. In other words, overpriced options tend to stay overpriced, and
underpriced options tend to stay underpriced. The cross-section of option implied-
variance has a smaller seasonal pattern than realized variance, suggesting that mar-
kets do not fully anticipate the seasonality of market volatility. Even after we
eliminate rm-month observations with dividend payments and earnings announce-
ments, the momentum and seasonality patterns remain strong. This suggests that
returns might be related to behavioral biases in forecasting volatility, rather than
information or cash ow events.
The option momentum eect is correlated with previous anomalies. For exam-
ple, it is well-known that option returns have a (negative) variance premium, and
this variance premium extends to the cross-section. Specically, Carr and Wu [2009]
and Goyal and Saretto [2009] showed that stock options with high prices, relative
to their historical volatility, have lower subsequent returns than options with low
prices. In other words, there is a variance premium associated with option value,
as measured by historical variance divided by current price. In contrast, option
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momentum is essentially a measure of historical variance divided by historical price.
While returns to option momentum and option value are correlated, multivariate
analysis shows that these two eects are distinct. In addition to being distinct from
option value, the returns to historical option momentum also remain largely unex-
plained by risks and other option return predictors, do not lie within the bid-ask
spread, and survive margin requirements.
Section 2 discusses the data used in our analysis. Section 3 explains how
the theoretical link between variance swaps and option strategies inspires protable
momentum strategies. Section 4 controls for option value, risk, and a wide range of
option return predictors. Section 5 examines the impact of option bid-ask spreads
to the protability of option momentum strategies, and a nal section concludes.
2.2 Data and Methodologies
We begin by constructing option strategies across individual stocks, and later
analyze the returns on these strategies. There are competing methodologies for
accommodating options with dierent strike prices. Bakshi and Kapadia [2003a] use
delta-hedged returns on selected option series, and Jones, Khorram, and Mo [2020]
use delta-hedged straddle returns. The gains of their delta-hedged option portfolio
qualitatively represent a volatility risk premium that depends on the options being
used. In contrast, the most prominent published benchmarks for option prices are
the Chicago Board of Options Exchange VIX index for S&P 500 options (CBOE,
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20193) and the corresponding equity-V IX indices for options on individual stocks.
These indices are based on portfolios of options, weighted by the squared reciprocals
of their strike prices. Carr and Wu [2009] interpolated option prices to measure
an idealized continuous V IX portfolio, and then used a continuous-time variance
swap approximation to the returns on their portfolio. Although it is not literally a
tradable option strategy, the variance swap approach has an intuitive advantage of
decomposing returns into risk-neutral variance and realized variance. We construct
returns on a discrete daily-hedged analog of the continuous variance swap option
strategy. This method provides a tradable strategy, while preserving the intuition
of the variance swap decomposition.
The CBOE (2019) V IX index is based on the (interpolated) market value of
a portfolio at time t comprising options expiring at time T .






where O(K, t;T ) represents time t price of an out-of-the-money call or put option
with strike price K and expiration T , and ∆i represents the gap between adjacent
strike prices.4 Importantly, V IX portfolios are "model-free" because their construc-
tion does not depend on any model parameters. Carr and Madan [2001] showed that
3CBOE White Paper used to construct the V IX index can be found at:
https://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf
4The sum uses out-of-the-money options with respect to the forward value of the strike price,
K(1 + rf )
T−t.
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we can approximate the V IX price with a continuous integral over strike prices.5






Given the spot price S(T ) at expiration, the option payoO(K,T ;T ) equalsMax(S(T )−K, 0)
for a call option and Max(K−S(T ), 0) for a put option. In the absence of interme-
diate dividends, integrating these option payos over strike prices (2.2) shows the
terminal payo of the idealized V IX portfolio.
V̂ (T ;T ) = −2 log( S(T )








where rf is the daily risk-free interest rate. The rst term in the payo (2.3) repre-
sents selling two units of the "log-portfolio". The second term represents a costless
static hedge that leverages (the present value of) two dollars of stock at time t, and
holds this hedge position constant until expiration at time T . The combined payo
is a U-shaped function of the stock price, resembling a squared stock return. There-
fore, the price of this portfolio represents the approximate (risk-neutral) variance
of return. Since the S&P 500 V IX index and equity-V IX indices on individual
stocks represent standard deviation, they are proportional to the square-root of the
portfolio value V (t;T ).
Due to their U-shaped payos, the equity-V IX portfolios have (approximately)
5See also Demeter, Derman, Kamal, and Zou [1999], Britten-Jones and Neuberger [2000], and
Jiang and Tian [2005] for various continuous-time derivations. Breeden and Litzenberger [1978]
rst expressed the risk-neutral density in terms of the second derivative of the option price with
respect to the strike price. Carr and Madan [2001] then derived the formula (2.2) using integration
by parts twice.
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zero delta when they are constructed. In other words, they are locally insensitive to
movements in the underlying stock price. But over time, the stock price will drift
away from the center of the U-shaped payo, and the equity-V IX portfolios will
become sensitive to the stock price. Instead of using a xed static hedge, we can
further reduce risk of the V IX portfolios by dynamic hedging. This replaces the
second term of (2.3) with delta-hedging of the log-portfolio. The elasticity of option
value with respect to the stock price generally depends on a model. But due to
the log-payo (2.3), the delta of the idealized continuous-strike V IX portfolio does
not. Instead, the delta-hedge of the log-portfolio buys 1/S(t) shares of stock for a
price of S(t), and rebalances to maintains a constant hedge exposure of one dollar.
So, not only is the value of the V IX portfolio model-free, but its dynamic-hedge
is also model-free. This dynamic hedge keeps the delta of the discrete equity-V IX
approximately equal to zero, and reduces the volatility of returns (relative to using
a xed static hedge). The dynamically hedged payo is
Vhedged(T ;T ) = −2 log(
S(T )




(rS(u)− rf ), (2.4)
where rS(u) represents the stock return on day u. We can replace the stock price in
equation (2.4) to express the Vhedged(T ;T ) payo in terms of a telescoping series of
daily stock returns rS(u) at times u between t and T :









(rS(u)− rf ). (2.5)
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When daily returns on the stock and risk-free rate are small, a second-order Taylor
series expansion shows that the dynamically hedged option portfolio (2.5) approxi-
mates the payo of variance swap contract in Carr and Wu [2009]:
Vhedged(T ;T ) ≈
T∑
u=t+1
(rS(u)− rf )2. (2.6)
The return on the unhedged V IX portfolio from equation (2.1) is simply the
proportional change in its value
runhedged(t;T ) =
V (T ;T )− V (t;T )
V (t;T )
. (2.7)
The return on the dynamically hedged V IX portfolio is adjusted by the dierence
between the static hedge term in (2.3) and the dynamic risk term in (2.4).
rhedged(t;T ) =












A comparison of the hedged return (2.8) with the Taylor Series approximation (2.6)
shows that the dynamically hedged return on the V IX portfolio is approximately







Carr and Wu [2009] used the variance swap approximation to analyze vari-
79
ance premiums in the cross-section of option returns, and Bollerslev, Tauchen, and
Zhou [2009] used it implicitly when forecasting returns variance premium. Giglio
and Kelly [2018] later applied it to multiple asset classes. In unreported diagnostics,
we found that the exact return on the underlying S&P 500 index V IX portfolio
is 99% correlated with the variance swap approximation (2.6). In other words, the
dynamically hedged payo on the index V IX portfolio is very close to the realized
variance over the month. But with individual stocks, the correlations of options re-
turns with realized variance can be lower. Using returns on hedged option portfolios
(2.8) is consistent with previous research that measured delta-hedged returns, while
preserving compatibility with the variance swap literature (2.9).
An additional advantage of our benchmark approach is that it measures option
portfolios with all available strike prices. These portfolios maintain consistent sen-
sitivity to volatility because they always include at-the-money options. In a certain
sense, a V IX portfolio is always at-the-money. In contrast, Bakshi and Kapadia
[2003a] approach of delta-hedging a single option will generally lose vega sensitivity
when the option drifts away from the money.
This paper uses data from the OptionMetrics Ivy DB database from January
1996 to December 2017. These data provide daily closing bid and ask quotes for
U.S. equity options. We use the T-bill rate of appropriate maturity (interpolated
when necessary) from OptionMetrics as the risk-free rate.6 Finally, we obtain in-
formation about stock returns, dividends, and rm characteristics from CRSP and
6Since average interest rates over this period were less than 2% per year, they had little eect
on our calculations with monthly returns.
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COMPUSTAT.
We apply a series of lters on the option data. First, we use only options
on S&P 500 constituent stocks within the sample period. This leaves us with a
total of 995 rms. Following Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov [2009], we remove all
observations for which the option open interest is equal to zero, in order to eliminate
options with no liquidity. We discard options with zero bid prices, and with missing
implied volatility or delta (which occurs for options with nonstandard settlement
or for options with intrinsic value above the current mid price). We delete all
observations whose ask price is lower than the bid price, and eliminate options whose
prices violate arbitrage bounds. We also require the mid-point bid-ask option quote
to be at least $0.125, and the underlying stock price to be at least $5. We delete
rm-month observations containing stock splits. Following Christoersen, Fournier,
and Jacobs [2018], we remove rm-month observations for which the present value of
dividends before expiration is larger than 4% of the stock price. Following Conrad,
Dittmar, and Ghysels [2013], we use an equal number of calls and puts to construct
V IX portfolios, using the midpoint of bid-ask quotes. Our nal sample includes
79,845 rm-month observations with 535,722 option contracts. On average, each
equity VIX portfolio consists of 6.71 option contracts.
The ocial CBOE V IX methodology combines options with dierent expi-
ration dates to achieve a 30-day weighted-average maturity. Our analysis uncovers
temporal periodicity in option prices and returns. To measure returns accurately, we
must calculate portfolio values without interpolating option prices across dierent
maturities. Therefore, we establish option position in equity-V IX portfolios on a
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Friday of each month, with exactly 28 days to expiration on the third Friday of the
subsequent month.7 This avoids interpolation by using exact option prices instead
of 30-day weighted-averages used by the CBOE (2019) V IX methodology. We cal-
culate returns to expiration on the underlying equity-V IX portfolio (2.1), hedged
daily according to (2.8), without using any approximations nor interpolations. The
resulting option portfolio value and its returns are model-free.
Panel A of Table 2.1 compares exact equity-V IX returns (2.8) with variance
swap returns (2.9) at the individual rm level. The gross variance swap return is
dened as the realized monthly variance of a stock return divided by the equity-
V IX price. Options have a negative variance premium, with equity-V IX returns
averaging a loss of 4.19% per month. While this seems large compared to average
equity returns, equity-V IX portfolios are risky and highly levered. The standard
deviation of return exceeds 85% per month. There is a particularly fat right tail,
where returns exceed 115% on the upper 5% of observations. The variance swap
return averages a loss of 2.64% per month. Overall, the two measures of return have
similar distributions, but the average equity-V IX return is more negative than the
average variance swap return.
Panel B shows the dierence between cross-sectional average equity-V IX re-
turns and variance swap returns in an equally weighted portfolio across all rms
at each month. This is eectively a portfolio of option portfolios. By exploiting
the benet of a large cross section, this approach diversies the approximation er-
7We usually establish the option positions on the third Friday of a month. In months with ve
Fridays, we postpone the portfolio formation by one week to keep a holding period of exactly 28
days. This procedure had little eect on our empirical results.
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ror between equity-V IX returns and variance swap returns. The average dierence
between equally weighted variance swap returns and equally weighted equity-V IX
returns is only 0.23% per month. Overall, equity-VIX returns are much less negative
than index VIX returns, whose monthly average equals −23.24%. This is consistent
with the ndings in Carr and Wu [2009] and Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov [2009].
To reliably calculate correlations and risk-exposures, Panel C of Table 2.1 re-
stricts the sample to 650 stocks which had data available to calculate equity-V IX
prices for at least 30 monthly observations. Panel C shows that across these 650
stocks, the average within-rm correlation between equity-V IX return and vari-
ance swap return is 75%, and the median correlation is 87%. An equally weighted
portfolio of all equity-V IX's as in Panel B gives an even higher correlation of 92%.
By comparison, the S&P 500 Index V IX produced a 99% correlation between the
variance swap return and the exact daily hedged V IX return. The variance swap
methodology produces a higher correlation for the S&P 500 Index V IX returns be-
cause there are more strike prices available to construct the option portfolios. While
the correlation between variance swap returns and equity-V IX returns is lower at
the individual rm level than that at the index level, much of the discrepancy gets
diversied away in large portfolios. It is reassuring to know that the two measures
are similar enough to support comparison of our new results with previous research.
The last row of Table 2.1 Panel A shows the Black-Scholes deltas, i.e., elas-
ticities with respect to the stock price. The deltas of the idealized continuous V IX
portfolios (2.3) are exactly zero, and Table 2.1 shows that the deltas of the equity-
V IX portfolios are nearly zero. Under the Black-Scholes assumptions, the equity-
83
V IX portfolios should be uncorrelated with stock returns. Panel C shows this is not
the case. Equity-V IX returns have strong negative betas with respect to the stock
return and even stronger negative betas with respect to S&P 500 returns. This is
because of negative correlation between stock returns and innovations in variance.
The nal row of Panel C shows that equity-V IX returns have an average positive
beta of 0.4 with respect to returns on S&P 500 index-V IX returns. In other words,
equity-V IX returns share exposure to systematic market variance.
Options on individual equities have an additional American early exercise fea-
ture. While there are many numerical methods and approximations to the optimal
exercise policy, a simple approximation is to exercise options early when their ex-
ercise value exceeds a certain threshold of the ask prices of options. Table A2.1 in
the Appendix performs sensitivity analysis to show that the early exercise premium
(0.36%) is small compared to the variance premiums in Table 2.1 and to the returns
of our momentum strategies.8 As an additional robustness check, we form option
momentum strategy each month using only non-dividend paying rms and compare
the result with that in Table 2.4. The monthly average return of momentum strat-
egy only changes slightly from 16.13% with a t-statistics of 8.42 to 16.23% with a
t-statistics of 8.14. Therefore, we ignore early exercise when computing returns in
subsequent tables.
8By using a binomial tree method, Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov [2009] nd that the early
exercise premium is between 0.3% and 1.1% for the 1-month option price. Our result lies in this
range.
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2.3 Option Portfolio Strategies
The previous section described construction of returns on our monthly equity-
V IX portfolios. We use returns to expiration on these discrete model-free option
portfolios. In the rest of this paper, when we form momentum strategies each month,
we only consider rms that were included in the S&P 500 Index at that month,
so that our strategy does not have forward-looking bias. Bakshi, Kapadia, and
Madan [2003] used 31 individual stocks, and Carr and Wu [2009] used 35 individual
stocks. Our substantially larger cross-section allows exploration of many dierent
investment strategies.
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993] developed the simplest benchmark for stock mo-
mentum strategies. Their "relative strength" strategies sort stocks based on histor-
ical return over 3-, 6-, 9-, or 12-month periods, and then hold the equally weighted
top decile of winner stocks and short the bottom decile of loser stocks for subsequent
3-, 6-, 9, or 12-month periods. We measure the corresponding option strategy that
buys the equally weighted top decile of equity-V IX option portfolios and shorts
the equally weighted bottom decile of losers every month. Following Jegadeesh and
Titman, we rebalance these portfolio each month to maintain equal weights.
Table 2.2 shows the results of simple decile spread strategies based on all
combinations of 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month formation periods and 3-, 6-, 9-, or 12-
month holding periods. The results are consistently protable. Across all formation
periods and all holding periods up to one year, the top decile of winners outperformed
the bottom decile of losers. For example, with the 3-month-formation/3-month-hold
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strategies, the top decile of winners earned an average of 2.74% per month, while
the bottom decile of losers lost 7.88% per month. This dierence exceeds 10% per
month. Across all strategies, the option decile spreads are economically large and
statistically signicant.
The strategies in Table 2.2 were not optimized for options. Table 2.2 merely
represents an out-of-sample test of Jegadeesh and Titman's original strategies on
an entirely new asset class. To understand why these strategies might be prof-
itable, we decompose the option portfolio returns according to the variance swap
approximation of the previous section.
Equation (2.9) shows that the gross return on an equity-V IX portfolio for the
ith stock over month t is approximately the realized variance, RVi(t), divided by the
cost of the equity-V IX portfolio V IX2i (t− 1). In logarithms, this relationship is
log(1 + ri(t)) ≈ log(RVi(t))− log(V IX2i (t− 1)). (2.10)
This return decomposition shows that predictability in equity-V IX returns reects
predictability in realized variance relative to equity-V IX prices. To diagnose the
sources of momentum prots, we run the cross-sectional regression
log(RVi(t)) = γ0,t + γk,t · log(RVi(t− k)) + εi(t). (2.11)
The coecient estimate γk,t shows the extent to which the cross-section of realized
variance in one month is predicted by the previous cross-section lagged by k-months.
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The average of γk,t over all months t shows the average relationship. Figure 1
(a) shows that the cross-section of realized variance is persistent, with coecients
exceeding 0.6 for short monthly lags, and declining as lags grow to ve years. Figure
1 (a) also displays the corresponding average coecients for the analogous regression
of the cross-section of logarithms of equity-V IX prices log(V IX2i (t)) on their own
lags. Option prices are even more persistent than realized variance, with average
coecients exceeding 0.8 for short monthly lags, and remaining above 0.5 even
for lags of ve years. Across dierent lags, both the realized variance and V IX2
coecients exhibit a striking quarterly periodicity. It appears that variance has
a quarterly seasonal pattern across stocks, and to a large extent, option prices
anticipate the pattern in future variance.
To ascertain whether option prices properly anticipate the persistence and sea-
sonality of realized variance, we run the cross-section regression using continuously
compounded variance swap returns,
log(1 + r̃i(t)) = γ0,t + γk,t · log(1 + r̃i(t− k)) + εi(t), (2.12)
where r̃i(t) denotes the variance swap return. While compounded variance swap
returns are not exactly equal to returns, they are a good approximation. Figure 1
(b) shows that the resulting pattern of average γ coecients across dierent lags
remains positive and visibly seasonal for at least ve years. Figure 1 (b) suggests that
option prices fail to properly anticipate the persistence and periodicity of realized
variance.
87
Table 2.3 shows the coecients of rst year lags from Figure 1 (b). The
univariate columns shows that coecient estimates are all highly signicant at all
lags, with t-statistics ranging from 6 to 11. To measure the incremental statistical
signicance of individual lags, the multivariate column of Table 2.3 reports average
(of time-series) coecients from multivariate cross-sectional regression that includes
a full year of monthly lags. The multivariate t-statistics are at least 3 at the quarterly
lags of 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-months. But they are mostly statistically insignicant at
other lags. This indicates that persistence in the cross-section of option returns is
primarily a quarterly seasonal phenomenon.
To recap, Table 2.2 provides simple and robust evidence that momentum
strategies are protable across options on dierent stocks. Figure 1 and Table 2.3
indicate this predictability has a quarterly pattern that lasts for up to ve years.
This suggests that we investigate strategies that exploit momentum and specically
quarterly momentum for various horizons up to ve years.
Inspired by Table 2.3 and Figure 1, Table 2.4 reports returns on one-month
equally weighted decile portfolios of equity-V IX option strategies ranked according
to dierent historical measures of variance swap momentum. The Year 1 "All"
deciles are sorted based on the geometric average of all 12 monthly variance swap
returns over the past year; the Year 2 "All" deciles are sorted based on monthly lags
12-24, and so forth. The Year 1 quarterly decile portfolios are sorted only based on
monthly lags 3, 6, 9, and 12. The Year 2 quarterly portfolio uses lags 15, 18, 21,
and 24, and similarly for Years 3, 4, and 5. The nonquarterly decile portfolios are
sorted on the monthly lags of a given year that are not quarterly, e.g., lags 1, 2, 4,
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5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 for Year 1.
Table 2.4 shows that average monthly returns are nearly monotonic across
momentum deciles sorted based on the past year of returns. Using all months in the
past year, the lowest decile lost 13.47% per month, while the highest decile gained
2.65% per month. The dierence exceeds 16% per month, and is highly statistically
signicant. Sorting deciles using only four lags of 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-months is nearly
as protable, with a decile spread of 14.77%. The quarterly eect must be quite
strong for a noisy momentum strategy using only 4 lagged months to be nearly
as protable as a strategy using all 12 lagged months within the past year. In
fact, the t-statistic for this quarterly winner-loser strategy exceeds the t-statistic
for the full-year strategy. The Year 1 Non-Quarterly strategy is also protable; the
corresponding 10-1 decile spread exceeds 11%. The Year 1 Quarterly decile spread
outperforms the Non-Quarterly decile spread by 3.42% per month.
To examine the source of prots of momentum strategies, we report the risk-
adjusted returns for the short- and long-leg in the portfolio Year 1 "All", controlling
for the V IX returns of S&P 500 Index, ve Fama and French [2015] factors, and
stock momentum factor. Results are reported in Table 2.5. In terms of raw returns,
the short leg (13.47%) contributes most to total prot (16.13%), as shown in the rst
row of Table 2.4. After adjusting for the risk exposure to index V IX returns, which
is largely negative, the winner portfolio contributes 70.4% to total risk-adjusted
prots (11.9% out of 16.9%). This resembles the pattern of stock market momentum
in Jegadeesh and Titman [1993].
The pattern of quarterly continuation in Table 2.4 relates to previous patterns
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of momentum in stock returns. Heston and Sadka [2008] found a quarterly pattern
of continuation when using lagged stock returns less than one year. But beyond one
year, this quarterly pattern disappeared. Instead, long-term stock returns exhibit
long-term reversal (De Bondt and Thaler [1985, 1987]), with continuation at annual
lags. The cross-section of option returns shares the quarterly pattern of continuation.
While the quarterly pattern of options gets weaker and statistically less signicant
as the horizon recedes, it denitely does not turn into reversal within ve years.
We have explored variables that might be related to the quarterly seasonal-
ity in option returns. These include rms' earnings months, ex-dividend months,
calendar month, and length of trading-month. These variables are easy to diagnose
by simply analyzing subsamples of monthly return observations. Unreported tables
resemble full-sample results, and show that none of these variables explain the sea-
sonal pattern in realized variance or in option returns. Jones, Khorram, and Mo
[2020] nd similar seasonal momentum eects in straddle returns, and conclude that
these eects remain strong after controlling for characteristics and factor risk. A be-
havioral explanation is that markets fail to fully anticipate seasonality in volatility.
This resembles the behavioral bias across expiration dates documented by Eisdorfer,
Sadka, and Zhdanov [2017]. Alternatively, there might be a distinct risk premium
associated with quarterly seasonal volatility. Similar patterns remain unexplained
in the stock momentum literature, and present questions for future research.
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2.4 Control for Risk and Option Return Predictors
If markets are ecient, then excess returns of options strategies should be
compensation for systematic risk. While our equity-V IX portfolios are hedged to
be insensitive to stock risk, they are constructed to be very sensitive to variance risk.
Systematic market variance has a well-known negative risk premium (Bakshi and
Kapadia [2003a]). The existence of a variance premium makes it plausible that past
returns are correlated with exposure to variance. For example, stocks with high past
variance swap returns might have high future comovement with systematic market
variance.
Table 2.4 controls for risk by regressing the long-short momentum strategy re-
turns on ve Fama and French [2015] factors and the momentum factor of Carhart
[1997]. It also includes the V IX returns of S&P 500 Index as an additional risk
factor. The intercept "alpha" from this regression represent risk-adjusted average
returns. These risk-adjusted means are generally close to the average decile spreads,
and do not alter their statistical signicance. There is little indication that momen-
tum returns in the cross-section of options are related to stock factors (including
momentum) or to covariance with systematic market volatility.
Given the protability of momentum strategies in options, a concern is whether
the momentum return eect is truly new, or just a disguised manifestation of ex-
isting anomalies. In particular, Goyal and Saretto [2009] and Carr and Wu [2009]
documented a signicant negative return premium on options with high implied
variance, relative to their historical variances. We dene option value as rolling
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1-year historical variance divided by current equity-V IX price. Option momentum
is similar to option value, because option momentum is historical realized variance
divided by historical equity-V IX price.
Table 2.6 distinguishes option momentum from option value using a double-
sort. The rows rst sort stocks into equally weighted quintiles by 12-month option
value. Then, the columns sorts by option momentum. The value eect is quite
strong, and returns are almost monotonic in every column. But they are also almost
monotonic in every row. The average excess return on the quintile spread of high
momentum minus low momentum across all stocks exceeds 12% per month, and is
largely unchanged when adjusted for risk factors. It appears that the eect of option
momentum is distinct from previously documented protability of option value.
While option momentum is not subsumed by option value, it may capture
some eects overlapped with previously documented option return predictors. To
control for these variables, we put them along with option momentum into a vector
Zi(t− 1), which is known at month t− 1. We then run a cross-section regression
ri(t) = γ0,t + γ
′
k,tZi(t− 1) + εi(t), (2.13)
where: ri(t) is the excess return of equity-V IX portfolio over risk-free rate; the
vector γ′k,t represents coecients for the option return predictors. The controlled
variables include HV-IV (volatility deviation in Goyal and Saretto [2009]), IVOL (id-
iosyncratic volatility in Cao and Han [2013]), Slope_VTS (slope of implied volatility
term structures in Vasquez [2015]), VOV (volatility of volatility constructed using
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option implied volatilities in Cao, Vasquez, Xiao, and Zhan [2019]), RN_Skew (risk-
neutral skewness in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan [2003]), Option Demand (option
demand pressure calculated as the ratio of the average option open interest times
|∆| of option contracts over the past week to the total stock trading volume over the
past week), Amihud (Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud [2002])), and stock char-
acteristics including rm size, book-to-market ratio, past one month stock return,
stock return momentum, analyst forecast dispersion, cash holding, protability, and
stock issues constructed as Cao, Han, Tong, and Zhan [2017]. To check the robust-
ness of results, we also use delta-hedged at-the-money (ATM) call and put returns
(calculated as Bakshi and Kapadia [2003a]) as the dependent variable, respectively.
Table 2.7 reports the time-series averages of γ coecients and their t-statistics,
corrected for autocorrelation following Newey and West [1987] with three lags. Con-
trolling for all of these option return predictors only moderately reduces the option
momentum coecient from 0.152 to 0.115. Results using delta-hedged call and put
returns display very similar pattern. Option momentum remains highly protable
and statistically signicant. We conclude that returns to option momentum are
substantially independent of the option return predictors documented in previous
literature.
2.5 Transaction Cost Analysis
Equity options have large trading costs. The median percentage bid-ask spread
of our equity-V IX portfolios, dened as absolute bid-ask spread divided by the mid-
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point price of equity-V IX portfolio, is 14%. Such large trading costs might eliminate
the prots on option strategies if mispricing lies entirely within the bid-ask spread.
Margin requirements are another type of friction. Santa-Clara and Saretto [2009]
show that margin requirements limit the notional amount of capital that can be
invested in option strategies. Therefore, Table 2.8 evaluates the eect of these two
trading frictions.
Table 2.8 uses the decile spread strategies from the rst row of Table 2.4,
forming monthly momentum portfolio based on "All" returns within the last year.
The "0%" in the rst column of Table 2.8 measures option prices at the mid-point
of bid-ask quotes, just as in Table 2.4. The last column uses the full quoted bid-ask
spreads. The intermediate columns use 50% and 75% of the quoted bid-ask spread
around the mid-point prices.
Table 2.8, Panel A shows that the "All", "Quarterly", and "Non-Quarterly"
strategies remain protable for trading costs equal to 50% of the quoted bid-ask
spread. When costs exceed 75% of the bid-ask spread, the "All" and "Quarterly"
strategies earn insignicant prots, and the "Non-Quarterly" strategy loses insignif-
icant money. When paying full bid-ask spreads, all the strategies lose money. Mu-
ravyev and Pearson [2019] show that the average eective bid-ask spread ratio for
trades taking into account of high frequency trade timing ability is around 50%.
In the presence of bid-ask spreads, one could just trade the cheaper options. A
simple strategy is to restrict trades to equity-V IX portfolio with percentage bid-ask
spreads below the sample median of 14%. Panel B shows that this restriction hardly
changes average prots when trading at the mid-point of the bid-ask spread. Indeed,
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this restriction insubstantially improves the mid-point prots from momentum based
on "All" months from 16.1% to 17.0%. Using mid-point returns, restricting the
sample increases the volatility and lowers the t-statistic due to a smaller sample
of available rms. But it substantially improves prots when paying transactions
costs. Even when paying the full bid-ask spread, the "All" strategy earns 9.1% per
month, and the "Quarterly" strategy earns 7.1% per month. These post-trading-
cost prots are positive at the 1% level of statistical signicance. We conclude that
with appropriate trade execution, the post-transactions cost momentum strategies
preserve about half the mid-point trading prots.
Since our option momentum strategy sells options in loser portfolios, we in-
vestigate the impact of margin requirements. We compute margins of the option
positions in loser portfolios following the CME margin system, which is applied to
institutional investors' margin accounts. Specically, we implement the scenario
analysis algorithm used in Goyal and Saretto [2009]. Each day, we use ±15% as the
range for stock price movement, with progressive increments of 3%, and ±10% as
the range for level of volatility. We then calculate option positions using the Black
and Scholes [1973] model under each scenario, and determine the margin by the
largest loss among those scenarios.
The initial margin haircut ratio is dened as M0−V0
V0
, where M0 is the initial
margin of option positions in the rm's V IX portfolio when the trade is imple-
mented, and V0 equals the sum of option prices when the position is opened. Since
additional margin calls may occur after the position is established, we also report
the maximum haircut ratio during the holding month. Since the loser portfolio
95
is equally weighted, we calculate the portfolio-level margin haircut by taking an
equal-weighted average of the haircuts for individual rms.
Panel C reports the margin haircut ratio of shorting the loser portfolio in
our "All" strategy. The initial haircut ratio has an average of 3.18 and maximum
value of 6.64.9 For each dollar of written options, investors need to borrow $3.18,
on average, to satisfy the initial margin requirement, which limits investors' option
exposure to 31% of their capital. During the holding period after portfolio formation,
the maximum haircut ratio has an average of 4.77 and maximum value of 8.94. To
further explore the impact of margins on option momentum returns, we check the
correlation between initial haircut and the momentum strategy return during the
subsequent holding period. The two have a correlation of -0.27, which means initial
haircuts tend to be high when the subsequent strategy returns are low. In this
sense, the initial margins actually lower investors' exposure to potential negative
momentum returns and alleviate the "momentum crashes" documented by Daniel
and Moskowitz [2016].
To measure the joint impact of bid-ask spreads and margin requirements faced
by institutional investors, we compute monthly returns from investing the inverse
initial margin ratio, V0
M0−V0 , in our 12-month option momentum strategy, and allocat-
ing the remainder to the risk-free asset. We also assume investors face 50% eective
bid-ask spread. Panel C reports the results in the "Return (%)" column. The aver-
age monthly return equals 4.53% with a t-statistic of 4.59. The minimum return is
9As a benchmark, Santa-Clara and Saretto [2009] nd that the initial margin of writing an
ATM index put has an average of 2.6 and maximum value of 11.6.
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-31.17%. The annual Sharpe Ratio is 1.00. Therefore, option momentum strategies
are protable after considering both margins and reasonable bid-ask spreads, with
a mild monthly maximum loss.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper develops a new methodology to calculate exact returns on model-
free V IX portfolios with a model-free dynamic hedge. This allows us to explore a
large panel of option returns across dierent stocks. The new methodology preserves
the intuition of continuous-time variance swaps; it decomposes returns into realized
variance and implied variance. This enables a comparison of the dynamics of realized
variance with the dynamics of implied variance.
We nd that a variety of momentum strategies are protable across options on
individual stocks. Option momentum is a measure of historical option returns, i.e.,
realized variance relative to historical option prices. A related measure of option
value is realized variance relative to current option prices. Returns to option mo-
mentum are distinct from returns to option value, and are not explained by standard
risk factors, stock characteristics, or bid-ask spreads.
Option momentum has intriguing commonalities and contrasts with stock mo-
mentum. Momentum in options across S&P 500 rms displays a strong quarterly
periodicity that matches the Heston and Sadka [2008] pattern of momentum within
one year, but does not match the Heston and Sadka annual pattern for long-term
momentum. Unlike stocks, options do not show long-term reversal of momentum
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prots. Instead, option momentum, particularly quarterly momentum, remains prof-
itable for up to ve years. It is tempting to speculate about risk factors or behavioral
biases that might explain returns to option momentum. A successful theory would
explain the quarterly pattern in options, and why the patterns of momentum prots
are dierent in stocks and options.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Equity-V IX Returns
The sample data are from January 1996 to December 2017. We select rms that were included in
the S&P 500 index during that period. There are 263 months of returns and 79,854 rm-month
observations in total. Equity-V IX Return is the actual realized return of underlying equity-
V IX portfolio, constructed as a static position in a basket of options plus a daily rebalanced
position in the underlying stock. Variance Swap Return (VSR) is dened as the realized
variance of the stock return divided by the price of the equity-V IX portfolio minus 1. Equity-
V IX Return - VSR is the dierence between equity-V IX return and variance swap return.
Index-V IX Return is the V IX return of S&P 500 Index. EW Equity-V IX Return is the cross
sectional average of equity-V IX returns each month. EW Variance Swap Return is the cross
sectional average of rms' variance swap returns each month. Black-Scholes Delta Elasticity
is the elasticity of equity-V IX portfolio with respect to the underlying stock price at the
formation date. βStock is the exposure of the rm equity VIX return to its stock return; βSP500
is the exposure of rms' equity-V IX returns to the S&P 500 index return; βMKT V IX is the
exposure of rm equity-V IX returns to the S&P 500 index V IX return. Correlation(Equity
VIX Return,VSR) is the rm level time-series correlation between equity-V IX returns and
variance swap returns. When calculating βStock, βSP500, βMkt V IX and Correlation(Equity-
V IX Return, VSR), we require rms to have at least 30 observations. There are 650 rms
meeting this requirement.
Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Panel A: Individual rms.
Number of Firms Each Month 304 111 147 203 293 411 468
Number of Strikes 6.71 4.90 4.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 14.00
Equity-V IX Return (%) -4.19 85.52 -69.18 -42.78 -19.49 14.73 115.1
Variance Swap Return (VSR) (%) -2.64 101.9 -71.66 -48.74 -24.73 11.73 126.3
Black-Scholes Delta Elasticity -0.05 0.09 -0.17 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
Panel B: Time series of S&P 500 Index and equally weighted (EW) portfolio.
Index-V IX Return(%) -23.24 72.66 -73.10 -56.43 -37.18 -13.80 65.52
Index Variance Swap Return(%) -24.35 74.19 -74.72 -58.32 -38.75 -13.11 60.02
EW Equity-V IX Return (%) -3.46 32.85 -38.03 -22.88 -9.87 6.64 56.13
EW Variance Swap Return (%) -3.23 44.19 -39.80 -26.13 -12.02 5.66 67.08
Panel C
Correlation(Equity-V IX Return, VSR) 0.75 0.31 0.13 0.69 0.87 0.95 0.99
βStock -2.24 2.55 -6.37 -3.36 -2.07 -0.98 1.06
βSP500 -4.02 3.50 -9.75 -5.98 -3.82 -1.96 1.18
βMkt V IX 0.40 0.31 -0.06 0.24 0.38 0.55 0.85
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Table 2.2: Option Momentum Strategy Returns
The momentum portfolios are formed based on J-month lagged equity-V IX returns and held
for K months as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In addition, we require the rms to have
non-missing equity-V IX returns for at least 23J past months. The values of J and K for the
dierent strategies are indicated in the rst column and row, respectively. To avoid forward-
looking bias, we only include rms that are included in the S&P 500 index when we form the
portfolio. The portfolios are equally weighted. The average monthly returns of these portfolios
are presented in this table. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Portfolio returns are
expressed in percent. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2017.
J K= 3 6 9 12
3 Loser -7.88 -6.81 -6.41 -6.42
(-3.53) (-3.09) (-2.95) (-2.94)
3 Winner 2.74 0.52 -0.93 -1.46
(1.00) (0.21) (-0.39) (-0.62)
3 Winner-Loser 10.63 7.32 5.49 4.96
(5.90) (5.44) (4.67) (4.43)
6 Loser -8.15 -7.69 -7.03 -7.10
(-3.48) (-3.36) (-3.08) (-3.15)
6 Winner 1.93 0.37 -0.74 -1.02
(0.69) (0.14) (-0.30) (-0.41)
6 Winner-Loser 10.08 8.05 6.29 6.08
(5.09) (4.93) (4.06) (4.22)
9 Loser -7.89 -7.61 -7.65 -7.17
(-3.07) (-3.16) (-3.27) (-3.09)
9 Winner 1.63 1.05 -0.01 -0.31
(0.60) (0.40) (-0.00) (-0.12)
9 Winner-Loser 9.52 8.67 7.64 6.86
(4.67) (4.82) (4.34) (4.19)
12 Loser -5.60 -7.18 -6.91 -7.15
(-2.22) (-2.91) (-2.83) (-3.02)
12 Winner 1.21 0.40 -0.17 -0.91
(0.43) (0.15) (-0.07) (-0.36)
12 Winner-Loser 7.21 7.58 6.74 6.24
(3.27) (3.95) (3.68) (3.57)
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(a) Coecients of log(RVi,t−k) and log(V IX
2
i,t−k)
(b) Coecients of log(1 + V SRi,t−k)
Figure 1. Monthly univariate cross-sectional regression of the form xi,t = αk,t+γk,t ·xi,t−k+
εi,t, are calculated for each month t and lag k, where xi,t is either the logarithm of realized
variance (RV), logarithm of the price of equity-V IX portfolio, or the logarithm of the variance
swap return (VSR) of rm i in month t. The regression is calculated for every month t from
January 1996 through December 2017 and for lag k values of 1 through 60. Figures (a) and
(b) plot the time-series averages of γk,t.
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Table 2.3: Univariate and Multivariate Cross-sectional Regressions of Vari-
ance Swap Returns
Monthly univariate cross-sectional regression of the form ri,t = αk,t + γk,t · ri,t−k + εi,t, are
calculated for each month t and lag k, where ri,t is the continuously compounded variance swap
return of rm i in month t. The regression is calculated for every month t from January 1996
through December 2017 and for lag k values 1 through 12. Monthly multivariate cross-sectional
regression takes the form: ri,t = αk,t +
∑12
k=1 γk,t · ri,t−k + εi,t. To avoid forward-looking bias,
we only include rms that are included in the S&P 500 index when we form the portfolio. The
time-series averages of γk,t along with their t-statistics, are reported in the table.
Univariate Multivariate
Lag Coecient t-statistic Coecient t-statistic
1 0.085 7.85 0.043 2.24
2 0.089 9.65 0.026 1.93
3 0.125 11.26 0.053 3.10
4 0.087 8.74 0.049 2.34
5 0.073 6.93 0.030 2.21
6 0.099 9.83 0.046 2.95
7 0.073 9.24 0.013 0.51
8 0.080 9.35 0.023 1.05
9 0.092 10.46 0.078 3.93
10 0.068 6.93 0.027 1.42
11 0.068 7.51 0.019 1.49
12 0.099 11.30 0.050 3.73
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Table 2.4: Returns of Strategies Based on Past Variance Swap Returns
Every month rms are grouped into ten portfolios according to various categories based on
the geometric average of past variance swap returns. To avoid forward-looking bias, we only
include rms that are included in the S&P 500 index when we form the portfolio. For example,
the trading strategy that is formed based on past quarterly returns during Year 2 ranks rms
according to their average log variance swap returns over historical monthly lags 15, 18, 21,
and 24. The trading strategy "All" in a given year is formed based on each rm's average log
variance swap return over that lagged year. The equity-V IX's in each portfolio are equally
weighted across rms, and portfolios are rebalanced monthly. To calculate alpha, we control
for the V IX return of the S&P 500 index, ve Fama and French (2015) risk factors, and
the Carhart (1997) stock momentum factor. The average monthly returns of these portfolios
are presented in percent, with t-statistics reported in parentheses. The sample period is from
January 1996 through December 2017.
Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 Alpha
Year 1 All -13.47 -7.82 -4.82 -3.56 -4.86 -1.58 -1.77 0.00 1.44 2.65 16.13 16.92
(8.42) (8.21)
Quarterly -12.56 -6.97 -5.62 -2.26 -3.23 -2.47 0.72 -0.10 -0.67 2.21 14.77 15.39
(8.75) (8.71)
Non-Quarterly -11.51 -6.57 -5.56 -2.73 -2.61 -1.31 -2.17 -0.84 0.71 0.13 11.64 11.52
(6.49) (5.99)
Year 2 All -9.10 -4.24 -5.13 -3.45 -2.32 -3.78 -3.97 -2.96 -1.75 -1.20 7.90 5.75
(3.98) (2.74)
Quarterly -7.26 -6.95 -2.98 -4.23 -4.62 -2.94 -1.23 -1.09 -3.85 0.54 7.80 8.27
(4.21) (4.15)
Non-Quarterly -5.92 -5.09 -6.36 -2.31 -3.52 -3.25 -1.17 -3.51 -3.50 -2.63 3.29 1.34
(1.48) (0.57)
Year 3 All -7.72 -5.87 -5.67 -3.70 -6.22 -4.87 -2.65 -5.45 -3.66 -3.63 4.09 2.01
(2.03) (0.94)
Quarterly -7.05 -7.91 -6.08 -6.67 -5.44 -4.10 -2.16 -2.38 -2.56 -3.84 3.21 2.88
(1.83) (1.52)
Non-Quarterly -6.95 -4.60 -4.26 -4.58 -4.37 -5.44 -4.30 -3.79 -4.47 -5.21 1.73 0.06
(0.97) (0.03)
Year 4 All -7.15 -5.63 -5.42 -4.95 -4.61 -4.76 -5.33 -4.81 -6.36 -4.21 2.94 3.11
(1.68) (1.65)
Quarterly -7.12 -5.41 -4.02 -5.71 -4.85 -5.78 -7.31 -5.47 -3.75 -1.81 5.31 4.85
(2.96) (2.50)
Non-Quarterly -6.11 -6.13 -4.35 -4.85 -4.46 -7.06 -4.64 -4.56 -5.45 -5.84 0.26 -0.67
(0.15) (-0.34)
Year 5 All -6.54 -7.66 -8.57 -8.07 -5.62 -7.73 -6.14 -6.84 -5.25 -3.55 2.99 0.18
(1.26) (0.07)
Quarterly -9.89 -8.51 -6.82 -5.93 -7.63 -5.58 -7.55 -5.78 -5.99 -3.89 6.00 5.39
(3.46) (2.86)
Non-Quarterly -6.24 -6.42 -6.60 -10.19 -8.13 -6.51 -7.45 -5.39 -3.91 -4.90 1.34 -0.94
(0.65) (-0.343)
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Table 2.5: Risk-adjusted Option Momentum Returns
Option momentum portfolios are formed by sorting rms' geometric average of all 12 monthly
variance swap returns over the past year, the same as the rst row in Table 2.4. The table
presents results from the following time-series regression: rp,t = αp + βp · Ft + εp,t, where rp,t is
the monthly excess return of loser, winner, and long-short portfolio, respectively. Ft is a vector
of risk factors including: the return of S&P 500 Index VIX portfolio in excess of the risk-free
rate, the Fama and French (2015) ve factors (MKT-Rf, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA), and
the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (Stock MOM). Coecient estimates are reported with
the associated t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
Loser Winner W-L
Alpha -0.051∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(-3.63) (5.99) (8.21)
Index VIX Ret-Rf 0.345∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.050
(15.85) (12.81) (1.56)
MKT-Rf -0.397 -0.002 0.395
(-1.05) (-0.00) (0.71)
SMB -0.962∗ -1.237 -0.275
(-1.82) (-1.65) (-0.35)
HML -0.653 0.141 0.794
(-1.34) (0.20) (1.10)
RMW -0.096 0.543 0.639
(-0.15) (0.61) (0.69)
CMA -0.049 -1.231 -1.182
(-0.06) (-1.04) (-0.95)
Stock MOM 0.022 -0.047 -0.069
(0.11) (-0.17) (-0.24)
Adj.R2 0.637 0.517 -0.004
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Table 2.6: Average Monthly Returns on Equity-V IX Portfolios Sorted on
Value and then Momentum




where log(RVi,t−12,t) is the geometric average of rm i's realized variance over the past 12
months. Then, within each quintile, we sort rms based on option momentum, which is the
compound variance swap return over the past 12 months. The "All" row shows statistics
for portfolios sorted by momentum only, without controlling for value. Portfolios are equally
weighted. Portfolio 1 has the lowest value or momentum. To avoid forward-looking bias, we
only include rms in the S&P 500 index when we form the portfolio. To compute the alpha of
portfolio returns, we control for the Fama and French (2015) ve factors, the Carhart (1997)
momentum factor, and the V IX return of the S&P 500 index. Returns are expressed in
percent, with t-statistics in parentheses.
Momentum
Value 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) 5-1 Alpha
1 (Low) -19.98 -13.66 -12.55 -9.63 -5.84 14.13 15.46
(5.21) (5.48)
2 -9.50 -8.14 -4.14 -5.83 -2.85 6.64 10.15
(2.95) (4.35)
3 -4.41 -4.40 -5.58 -2.90 1.07 5.48 2.99
(2.18) (1.13)
4 -3.23 0.19 0.89 -0.19 2.70 5.93 7.56
(2.04) (2.42)
5 (High) -1.07 5.23 5.39 3.03 7.42 8.49 9.56
(3.00) (3.11)
All -10.62 -4.20 -3.22 -0.87 2.04 12.67 12.69
(8.48) (7.93)
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Table 2.7: Option Momentum Controlling for Other Predictors
We estimate the cross-sectional regression: ri,t = αt+γt ·Zi,t−1+εi,t, where ri,t is the monthly
equity-V IX returns in excess of risk-free rate, and Z ′s are option return predictors including
Option MOM (continuously compounded variance swap return over the past 12 months), HV-
IV (volatility deviation in Goyal and Saretto (2009)), IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility in Cao and
Han (2013)), Slope_VTS (slope of implied volatility term structures in Vasquez (2017)), VOV
(volatility of volatility in Cao et al. (2020)), RN_Skew (risk-neutral skewness in Bakshi et al.
(2003)), Option Demand (option demand pressure), Amihud (Amihud illiquidity measure over
the previous month), and stock characteristics in Cao et al. (2017). Results using delta-hedged
ATM call and put returns calculated as Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) are also reported. The
associated t-statistics using Newey and West (1987) with three lags are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1997 to December 2017.
Equity-V IX Return Delta-hedged Call Delta-hedged Put
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Option MOM 0.152∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(7.18) (5.75) (5.52) (6.23) (6.37) (6.13)
HV-IV 0.113∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(2.26) (3.67) (3.74)
IVOL -2.629∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-2.67) (-4.02) (-2.77)
Slope_VTS 0.640∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(4.23) (6.93) (7.33)
VOV -0.664∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.028∗∗∗
(-3.03) (-1.11) (-2.87)
RN_Skew 0.017 -0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(1.18) (-2.50) (3.23)
Option Demand -0.005∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(-3.72) (-2.89) (-1.98)
Amihud 88.835 1.960 3.350
(1.45) (0.82) (1.29)
Size 0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.34) (-0.23) (-0.19)








Analyst Dispersion -0.052 0.002 0.002
(-0.83) (0.69) (0.77)
Cash Holding 0.029 -0.000 0.002∗
(1.08) (-0.26) (1.92)
Protability -0.016 0.001∗ 0.001
(-0.80) (1.81) (0.70)
Issue 0.082 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗
(1.62) (1.95) (2.35)
Intercept -0.003 0.012 0.001 0.004 -0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
(-0.12) (0.08) (0.63) (0.79) (-3.14) (0.07)
adj. R2 0.016 0.072 0.017 0.109 0.019 0.106
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Table 2.8: Impact of Transaction Costs
Option momentum portfolios are formed as in Table 2.4. The portfolio returns are computed
from the mid-point price and from the eective bid-ask spread, estimated to be equal to 50%,
75%, and 100% of the quoted spread. In panel B, if the percentage bid-ask spread of VIX
portfolio price of a rm is larger than the sample median, we don't trade the rm that month.
All returns are expressed in percent, with t-statistics in parentheses. Panel C reports the margin
haircut ratio of shorting loser portfolios. The initial margin haircut is dened as (M0−V0)/V0,
where M0 is the initial margin of option positions in equity-V IX portfolios when the trade is
implemented, and V0 equals the sum of option prices when the position is opened. Max haircut
is the maximum haircut ratio during the month. Correlation between initial haircut ratio and
the subsequent option momentum strategy return of the month is also reported. The column
"Return (%)" in Panel C reports the monthly return of momentum strategy "All" with 50%
eective spreads combined with initial margin requirements. The t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis.
Panel A: Option momentum returns
Percentage of Quoted Bid-Ask Spread
0% 50% 75% 100%
All 16.13 6.74 1.86 -3.22
(8.42) (3.62) (1.00) (-1.69)
Quarterly 14.77 5.85 1.24 -3.53
(8.75) (3.55) (0.75) (-2.08)
Non-Quarterly 11.64 2.52 -2.31 -7.46
(6.49) (1.44) (-1.30) (-4.08)
Panel B: Percentage bid-ask spread lower than median.
All 17.05 13.25 11.17 9.08
(5.66) (4.48) (3.78) (3.08)
Quarterly 13.91 11.53 9.35 7.17
(5.52) (4.08) (3.31) (2.53)
Non-Quarterly 11.95 8.13 6.03 3.93
(4.90) (3.43) (2.54) (1.65)
Panel C: Margin haircut ratio of loser portfolio.
Initial haircut Max haircut Correlation Return (%)
Mean 3.18 4.77 -0.27 4.53 (4.59)
Std 1.29 1.59 15.64




Table A2.1: Early Exercise Premium
This table examines the dierence between the European option return-to-expiration and the
American early exercise return of our equity-V IX portfolios. We consider approximate policies
that exercise options at end of each day if the exercise value is higher than 95%, 96%, 97%,
98% and 99% of the ask price of the option. Using these policies, there are up to 17,000 rm-
month observations with early exercise. To calculate the early-exercise payo of a call option,
we borrow the strike price at risk-free rate and hold the stock position to option maturity; to
calculate the early exercised payo of a put option, we short-sell the stock and reinvest the
payo to maturity at risk-free rate. All dividends are reinvested to maturity at the risk-free
rate.
The Mean calculates the monthly average error between the European return and the American
return. All returns are expressed in percent. The standard error (Std) calculates the standard
deviation of the error. The mean absolute error (MAE) calculates the monthly average absolute
error. Correlation reports the correlation between European return and American return.
Panel B shows that the maximum American exercise premium of .355% is achieved with an
early-exercise threshold of 96%. This is smaller, by an order of magnitude, than the average
European return-to-expiration of -4.19% in the rst row of Table 1 Panel A. We conclude that
early exercise is not quantitatively important to our analysis.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of European Return and American Return
Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
European -4.195 85.52 -69.18 -42.78 -19.49 14.73 115.10
American 99% -3.970 85.59 -69.06 -42.56 -19.22 15.01 115.45
American 98% -3.895 85.58 -69.01 -42.49 -19.12 15.11 115.53
American 97% -3.849 85.51 -69.02 -42.42 -19.04 15.19 115.47
American 96% -3.839 85.47 -69.00 -42.38 -19.02 15.20 115.38
American 95% -3.854 85.43 -69.02 -42.38 -19.02 15.19 115.43
Panel B: Early Exercise Premium
Mean Std MAE t-statistic Correlation
99% 0.225 4.35 0.627 14.59 0.999
98% 0.299 5.00 0.782 16.91 0.998
97% 0.346 5.77 0.959 16.93 0.998
96% 0.355 6.40 1.099 15.68 0.997
95% 0.341 6.89 1.237 13.98 0.997
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